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CASE NOTES
Admiralty-Shipping Act of 1916-Steamship Conference Must Show
Commercial Necessity of Dual-Rate Contracts for Approval Under Section
14b.-Petitioner, a steamship conference' which served five trade areas,2 filed
proposed dual-rate contracts3 with the Federal Maritime Commission for ap-
proval pursuant to the requirements of section 14b of the Shipping Act These
exclusive patronage contracts obligated shippers and receivers in any of the trade
areas to use conference vessels in all the areas. The Commission said it would
approve the proposed contracts only if petitioners agreed to offer them on a
separate basis in each of the five trade areas.5 Petitioners appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which affirmed the
separability condition.7 Held: The Commission had properly placed upon peti-
tioners the burden of proving that these dual-rate contracts were necessary in
terms of "legitimate commercial objectives," and that petitioners had not met
1. Conferences have been described as "agreements organized by shipping lines to restrict
or eliminate competition, to regulate and rationalize sailing schedules and ports of call, and
occasionally to arrange for the pooling of cargo, freight monies, or net earnings. They gen-
erally control prices, Le. freight rates and passenger fares." D. Marx, International Shipping
Cartels 3 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Marx].
2. Latin America/Pacific Coast S.S. Conf. v. F.M.C., 465 F.2d 542, S43-44 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
3. A dual-rate contract is an agreement whereby a shipper obligates himself to use con-
ference vessels exclusively and is in return charged lower rates for the carriage of his cargo.
Marx 55-56. -
4. Section 14b of the Act provides in pertinent part: "[O]n application the Federal
Maritime Commission ... shall, after notice and hearing, by order, permit the use by any
common carrier or conference . .. of any contract, amendment, or modification thereof ...
which provides lower rates to a shipper or consignee who agrees to give all or any fixed
portion of his patronage to such carrier or conference of carriers . .. ." 46 U.S.C. § 813a
(1970).
5. The Dual Rate Cases, 8 F.M.C. 16 (1964). The Commission held that "[I]f the con-
ference is permitted to offer a single dual rate contract which includes all five of the trade
areas, merchants will be forced to obligate themselves to exclusive conference patronage in
trade areas not desired in order to obtain contract rates in a trade area where they feel the
dual rate contract meets their needs. This seems to us neither necessary nor fair." Id. at So.
6. The full history of this case spans a decade. In 1962 petitioners filed the proposed
dual-rate contracts for approval and the Commission imposed its requirement of separability.
This ruling was upheld on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pacific Coast
European Conf. v. United States, 350 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 9S8 (1965).
However, it was set aside on rehearing by the same court in an unpublished per curiam
opinion. Following remand the Commission again imposed its separability condition relying
on F.M.C. v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968), which had been decided in the
interim. Agreement No. 8660-Latin America/Pacific Coast S.. Conf. and Proposed Contract
Rate System, 12 F.M.C. 149 (1969). From this ruling petitioners instituted their appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 465 F.2d at 543-45.
7. 465 F.2d at 543.
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this burden. Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference v. Federal Mari-
time Commission, 465 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Steamship conferences have been a fact of maritime life since the early days
of the steamer in the British East India Trade.8 It was found that in order to
operate economically, cargo carrying vessels had to carry close to capacity. In
order to secure full cargoes, independent steamship lines naturally scheduled
most sailings to and from busy ports at peak seasons. As a consequence, shippers
found an abundance of carriers available at certain times of year, with rates de-
pressed by competition. During slack seasons, however, only a few lines were
willing to schedule sailings and at extremely high rates.9 The resulting schedule
and rate instability hurt the shippers; the intense competition periodically
thinned the ranks of the steamship lines, leaving to those which could hold out
longest the spoils of high carrying rates until other lines, enticed by this wealth,
would move in to begin anew the rate wars.' 0 Steamship conferences were the
answer to this strife, introducing a measure of stability to the steamship trade
at the price of decreased competition."
In the first decade of this century, conference practices came under the scru-
tiny of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings in Great Britain.12 The Com-
mission found that in order to function effectively, conferences employed what
were known as tying arrangements-that is, agreements which bound a shipper
to a conference and denied his cargo to competing independent lines.'3 Such ar-
rangements were deemed necessary by the conferences because it was felt that
"[a]ny substantial invasion of the trade by a lower-rated competitor would lead
to the break-up of the conference, either by resignation or by declaring rates
'open', which means that they are fixed by the individual lines and not by con-
ference action."'11 The most frequently employed tying arrangements were the
deferred rebate system'5 and the dual-rate contract. A dual-rate contract has
been defined as:
an exclusive patronage contract whereby a shipper-or consignee-promises to trans-
port all of the cargo under his control, between ports within the scope of a steamship
conference agreement, aboard vessels belonging to that conference. Shippers who do
8. Royal Commission Report on Shipping Rings 12 (1909).
9. See Dodds, Legality of Shipper Tying Arrangements in Ocean Commerce, 23 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 933, 934 (1962); Gardner, Steamship Conferences and the Shipping Act, 1916, 35
Tulane L. Rev. 129, 130 (1960). See generally Marx 7-25.
10. Gardner, supra note 9, at 130.
11. Marx 19-22; see Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 635,
636 (1965).
12. Royal Commission Report on Shipping Rings (1909); see Marx 50; Dodds, supra
note 9, at 936-37; McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant
Marine, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 191, 193 (1960).
13. Royal Commission Report on Shipping Rings 12, 37 (1909).
14. Gardner, supra note 9, at 132.
15. The deferred rebate system was a device whereby conferences would charge all
shippers the same rates, but would then refund a percentage of the rates paid by a shipper
over a prescribed period provided during that time the shipper had used conference vessels
exclusively. See Marx 55; McGee, supra note 12, at 232.
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not sign such an agreement are assessed a rate, called the noncontract rate, substantially
above the so-called contract rate which is available to signatories. 10
In 1912 the Alexander Committee,17 a subdivision of the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee of the House of Representatives, followed the lead of
the Royal Commission and began a study of shipping conferences, their prac-
tices, and the relation of these to the antitrust laws.18 In 1914 the Committee
published a compilation of its findings and recommendations in what became
known as the Alexander Report 9 The Report favored continuation of the con-
ference system under government supervision and control in order to secure
stable rates and more frequent scheduling of sailings, and to keep American and
European rates on a parity.20 However, several conference practices were con-
demned as unduly discriminatory.2 '
Influenced by the Alexander Report, Congress enacted the Shipping Act of
1916.22 The Act provided that shipping conferences would be exempted from
antitrust law if the agreements forming them were filed with and approved by
the Shipping Board.23 Specifically prohibited were deferred rebates,24 fighting
shipss retaliation or discrimination against any shipper, and unfair or unjustly
discriminatory contracts with any shipper.2 0 Also prohibited was undue or un-
reasonable preference of a shipper 2 7 Nowhere, however, did the Act specifically
16. Testimony of Senator Kefauver, Index to Legislative History of Steamship Conference
Dual Rate Law, S. Doc. No. 100, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1962); see McGee, supra note 12,
at 232-33.
17. The Committee was named for Representative Joshua W. Alexander, Chairman of
the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, who had sponsored a success-
ful resolution to have a study made of shipping combinations. Proceedings of the House
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries in the Investigation of Shipping Combina-
tions Under HR. 587, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1913).
18. As Committee Chairman Alexander later pointed out, the purpose of the inquiry was
to ascertain "whether or not we should recognize the agreements existing between carriers
by water or recommend that the Sherman antitrust law should be enforced against them and
these conferences broken up." 54 Cong. Rec. 8077 (1916); see Dodds, supra note 9, at 939.
19. House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Report on Steamship Agree-
ments and Applications in the American Foreign and Domestic Trade, H.R. Doc. No. 805,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
20. Id. at 416-17.
21. The Alexander Report specifically decried the use of deferred rebates and so-called
"fighting ships," conference vessels which quoted less than compensatory rates (losses being
distributed among the members) in order to drive out independent lines. Id. at 305-07.
22. Shipping Act, 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 80142 (1970).
23. Id. § 15, 39 Stat. at 734. The Act created the Shipping Board to regulate the confer-
ences and to foster the growth of the American merchant marine. Id. § 4, 39 Stat. at 729.
The Shipping Board was successively replaced by the Shipping Board Bureau of the Depart-
ment of Commerce, 1933-36, the United States Maritime Commission, 1936-50, the Federal
Maritime Board, 1950-61, and the Federal Maritime Commission. Marx 10S.
24. See note 15 supra.
25. See note 21 supra.
26. Shipping Act, 1916, ch. 451, § 14, 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1970).
27. Id.
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
prohibit dual-rate contracts; 28 and the legality of dual-rate systems became the
"burning issue" of United States ocean commerce.2 9
Under section 15 of the Act,80 the Shipping Board possessed the power to
withdraw its approval of a conference agreement-thereby removing the confer-
ence's exemption from the antitrust laws and forcing it, in effect, to disband.
Thus, although given no statutory power to oversee rates, the Board nevertheless
possessed this power in a very real sense. Possession of power in this instance,
however, proved quite different from its exercise. One commentator has noted:
"Until 1954 it was generally assumed by the Board and the industry that the
approved establishment of a shipping rate conference gave it implicit authority
to establish a [dual] contract rate system."' This assumption, coupled with the
reality of Board inaction, gave rise to conference abuse of the dual-rate system.12
The proliferation of such abuse eventually forced independent lines into the
difficult choice of either joining the conferences, or abandoning routes plied by
conference vessels. In 1954, however, Isbrandtsen Lines, a large independent
carrier threatened with great loss by a proposed dual-rate system, sought the
aid of the Justice Department. At that point began almost a decade of litigation
aimed at declaring the dual-rate contract an illegal device. 8
The Isbrandtsen litigation was instigated by the application of the Japan-
Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference for Board approval of a proposed dual-rate
system.84 The Japan-Atlantic conference was a competitor of Isbrandtsen in the
lucrative trade between the Far East and the Pacific and Gulf ports in the
United States. The proposed system provided for a nine and one-half percent
difference in the contract and noncontract rates, and for liquidated damages in
the amount of fifty percent of the freight charges paid to nonconference carriers
in the event of a shipper's breach.8 5 Over Isbrandtsen's objection, the Maritime
Board allowed the dual-rate system to become effective pending a hearing on the
question of approval.30 Isbrandtsen then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the
28. Latin America/Pacific Coast S.S. Conf. v. F.M.C., 465 F.2d 542, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Possibly this is explained by the fact that before its express prohibition in the Act the deferred
rebate was the favored and prevalent form of tying arrangement, as compared with which
the dual rate contract appeared rather infrequently. See Marx 55. Furthermore, the deferred
rebate has been considered to be the more onerous device; to impose a "tighter hold upon
shippers" than the contract preference system. McGee, supra note 12, at 233. The truest
analysis, however, seems to be that dual rate contracts were not prohibited simply because
they were not disapproved of in the Alexander Report. See Dodds, supra note 9, at 940.
29. Dodds, supra note 9, at 941.
30. Shipping Act, 1916, ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
31. Gardner, supra note 9, at 133.
32. Id. at 136. As Gardner succinctly observed: "It is not possible, in this world of
ordinary men, to maintain an awed respect, or even a consistent adherence, to a statute
which has been substantially unenforced for nearly half a century." Id.
33. See text accompanying notes 34-47 infra.
34. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
990 (1954).
35. 211 F.2d at 53.
36. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 239 F.2d 933, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356
U.S. 481 (1958).
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District of Columbia Circuit for injunctive relief, which was granted in Isbrandt-
sen Co. v. United States3 7 The court chastised the Board for abrogation of its
responsibilities, and disallowed initiation of the proposed system until the Board
had either given or denied approval under its section 15 power to compel filing
of all conference agreements.38
Subsequently the conference "opened" its rates-i.e., allowed each member
line to fix rates-so as to compete effectively with Isbrandtsen. The resultant
rate war hurt both sides as rates dropped to noncompensatory levels.30 The
Board, prompted by the gravity of the situation (as well, perhaps, as by its
generally pro-conference outlook), approved the filed dual-rate system. °
In isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, Isbrandtsen and the Justice Department
appealed this ruling and won reversal. 41 In its decision, the circuit court first
addressed itself to the divergent viewpoints of the Maritime Board and the
Justice Department. While the Board favored a stable rate situation conducive
to the growth of the American Merchant Marine,4s the Justice Department was
concerned with what must have seemed to it, in the words of one commentator,
"a primordial monster which has somehow survived from the mists of pre-
Sherman history."43
Finding against the Board, the court noted: "We might agree with the Board
that the objectives it seeks in approving the dual-rate system are consistent with
the objectives of the [1916] statute; but these can be furthered only by means
permitted by the statute.144 The Board argued that dual-rate contracts were
permitted means because they were not specifically prohibited by the Act, as
were deferred rebates.45 In response the court pointed to the language in section
14(3) prohibiting "retaliation" against any shipper,4 0 and contended further
that the dual-rate system proposed was vastly different from that in existence
in 1916-.e., that the latter had involved "bona fide requirements contracts"
whereas the former was merely a device to compel shipper loyalty at the price
of- severe penalties for breach. 47
The Board appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with Isbrandtsen and
37. 211 F.2d at 57. The court noted that until the Board had approved such an agreement
it would not be considered as exempt from operation of the antitrust laws, under which price
fixing was illegal per se. Id., citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 U.S. 150
(1940).
38. Id. Section 15 of the Act, as enacted originally, authorized the Board to disapprove
or modify any unjustly discriminatory agreements, and to approve all other filed agreements.
Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970); see
text accompanying note 30 supra.
39. See 239 F.2d at 935.
40. Japan-Atlantic & Gulf Freight Conf., 4 F.,.C. 706, 742-43 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d
933 (D.C. Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
41. 239 F2d at 933.
42. Id. at 937.
43. Gardner, supra note 9, at 129.
44. 239 F.2d at 936 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 939.
46. Id. at 938.
47. Id. at 940 (concurring opinion).
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the Justice Department,48 holding that in section 14 of the Act, Congress had
covered all predatory practices to which conferences might resort, including
dual-rate contracts.49
Faced with a Supreme Court decision which had for all intents and purposes
outlawed dual-rate systems, the shipping lobby turned to Congress for succor.
A friendly Congress obliged, passing a moratorium law"0 which allowed dual-rate
contracts pending more permanent legislation.
After exhaustive hearings, 51 Congress passed the 1961 Amendments to the
Shipping Act,5 2 and "reaffirmed its view that some monopoly in ocean shipping
is necessary but that it must be regulated to prevent abuses." 8 The House had
favored an antitrust oriented bill, but the more permissive Senate version was
passed.5"
Section 14 of the Act was amended to specifically allow dual-rate contracts if,
among other provisos, the Federal Maritime Commission found them not to be
detrimental to United States commerce, contrary to the public interest, or un-
justly discriminatory. 5  Despite the qualifications imposed, it seemed indeed
that the conferences had been given by Congress what they couldn't win in the
courts; that new life had been breathed into the dual-rate contract.50
In 1968, however, the Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate the 1961
Amendments in a case involving a tying arrangement similar in spirit to a dual-
rate contract. In F.M.C. v. Svenska Amerika Liniens7 the Court was presented,
inter alia, with an agreement whereby a conference prohibited travel agents
booking passage on its ships from selling passage on competing, non-conference
lines.5s The Federal Maritime Commission had found this arrangement to be
detrimental to commerce and violative of the public interest standard of amended
48. Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
49. Id. at 491-93.
50. Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-626, 72 Stat. 574. This interim legislation, ar-
ranged to be inserted at the end of the Shipping Act, declared that "nothing in this section
or elsewhere in this Act, shall be construed or applied to forbid or make unlawful any dual
rate contract arrangement in use by the members of a conference on May 19, 1958, which
conference is organized under an agreement approved . . .by the regulatory body adminis-
tering this Act, unless and until such regulatory body disapproves, cancels, or modifies such
arrangement . . . ." Id.
51. See House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Providing for the Operation
of Steamship Conferences, H.R. Rep. No. 498, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
52. 46 U.S.C. §§ 813a, 814, 815, 817, 819, 841a (1970).
53. Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 641. The Note pro-
vides a general overview of the congressional history of the 1961 Amendments to the Ship-
ping Act.
54. See 465 F.2d at 550 & n.26.
55. 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1970). Identical provisos appear in amended section 15, which
authorizes cancellation of any filed agreement found to contravene them.
56. See Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 642 (1965).
57. 390 U.S. at 251.
58. Id. at 240.
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section 15. 9 It reached this conclusion by resting upon the conference the
burden of adducing facts justifying the restraint in terms of serious transporta-
tion need, and by finding that this burden had not been met.G0 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Commission,0' thus setting the stage for the instant case.
In Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference v. Federal Maritime
Commission62 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit was faced with several problems. Did the rationale of Svenska, holding a
specific tying arrangement to be contrary to the public interest under section 15,
apply as well to dual-rate contracts in view of the affirmative direction of that
section that the Commission "shall" permit such contracts?63 If so, did the
burden of showing an overriding need for the system shift, as in Svenska, to
petitioners after the Commission had decided that the proposed contracts were
contrary to the public interest? If it did shift, did the petitioners in fact here
meet their burden? The court resolved these problems in favor of free competi-
tion and affirmed the Commission's ruling denying approval of the proposed
system.64
Petitioners urged that Svenska was distinguishable since it concerned a pas-
senger agent tying arrangement under section 15, rather than a dual-rate system
under section 14 of the Act.65 They argued further that even if Svenska were in
point, the Commission had misapplied it and had improperly evaluated the evi-
dence. 66 Petitioners also pointed to the clear language of section 14b which
purported to allow dual-rate systems, and alleged that this mandate precluded
imposition upon them of the burden of proving the propriety of such systems.01
The Commission replied that the tests of discrimination and detrimental effect
on commerce, as well as the public interest standard, had been specifically added
to section 14b, the dual-rate section, as well as to section 15, the section
covering all agreements.68 The court, noting this, agreed with the Commission
59. Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10 F.M.C.
27 (1966).
60. Id. at 34-35. The Supreme Court held that the showing required by the Commission
-Le., serious transportation need-was "an appropriate refinement of the statutory 'public
interest' standard." 390 U.S. at 245-46.
61. 390 U.S. at 251.
62. 465 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
63. See note 67 infra.
64. 465 F.2d at 543.
65. Id. at 551.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 552. In response to this contention the court urged that "the language of section
15 is no less mandatory," and that "[d]espite th[e] mandatory language in section 15, the
Supreme Court has permitted imposing the burden upon conferences in section 15 proceed-
ings. We see no reason to differ with respect to section 14b ... ." Id.
68. 465 F.2d at 552-53. The court pointed out that the "public interest" standard articu-
lated in the 1961 Amendments was in both sections similarly phrased. It noted: "The
language of section 14b is: 'detrimental to the commerce of the United States or contrary
to the public interest.' Section 15 uses the following words: 'detriment of the commerce
of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest."' Id. at 552 n.32.
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and held that "we see no reason to reach a different conclusion [than the Svenska
court had reached as to section 15] with regard to section 14b . . . .We feel
that the ambiguities, if any, should be resolved in favor of free competition."0 0
Thus, once the Commission ascertained that a certain practice under either sec-
tion 15 or section 14b was contrary to the public interest,70 it could shift to
petitioners the burden of proving, as the Svenska court had directed, a trans-
portation need which outweighed antitrust considerations.
Petitioner's argument that such a finding rendered nugatory the congressional
allowance of dual-rate contracts was rejected by the court. It noted that "placing
the burden of proof upon the conference does not make the limited antitrust
immunity conferred by the Shipping Act illusory because actions which would
violate antitrust laws may still be approved if sufficient justification for them
exists." 71
Once the court had determined that the public interest test applied by the
Commission was valid, it had little difficulty in upholding that body's finding
that the petitioner failed to prove necessity for dual-rate contracts covering all
of the five trade areas in that conference's sphere of operations.7 " In concluding
the court stated:
We should bear in mind that the Commission did not disapprove of the dual-rate con-
tract concept, but merely placed limitations upon its use. Such action is clearly in accord
with our national policy that only the least restrictive inroads into free competition will
be tolerated. Absent the protection of section 14(b), the exclusive patronage tying
system embodied in a dual-rate contract would clearly run counter to the antitrust
laws.73
Despite the court's conclusion that the dual-rate concept was still valid, its
decision removed much of the efficacy of such agreements. A dual-rate contract
which ties a shipper to a conference, but which fails to cover four-fifths of the
trade of that conference, loses much of its effect. Furthermore, the extension
by the court of the Svenska burden of proof to dual-rate contracts gives the
Maritime Commission enough latitude to deny approval to almost any conceiv-
able variation of dual-rate contract.74 In Latin America the court attempted to
69. 465 F.2d at 552.
70. The Svenska Court had held that an antitrust violation would alone constitute evi-
dence that an agreement was contrary to public policy. 390 U.S. at 245-46. Hence proposing
a dual-rate contract-by its very nature violative of antitrust principles-would automatically
entail a showing by petitioner of an over-riding need for such a contract. 465 F.2d at 554-55.
71. 465 F.2d at 554.
72. Id. at 555-57. The court noted that the scope of its review had been summarized by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Port of New York Authority v. F.M.C., 429 F.2d 663
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971), wherein it was said respecting review of ad-
ministrative rulings: "As to fact questions, we must consider whether the order in question
is supported by substantial evidence. We are not to review the matter de novo nor are we
to substitute our discretion for that of the Commission to provide a forum for the solution
of the technical and complex matters involved in the shipping industry." Id. at 666.
73. 465 F.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
74. See notes 70 & 72 supra.
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resolve the question which had been raised by every dual-rate contract case
since the passage of the Shipping Act: At what price stability? The court here
decided that the dual-rate contract, in its purest and most effective form, is too
great a price. In so deciding the court recognized the metamorphosis which such
agreements had undergone-from the "bona fide requirements contracts" of the
days of the Alexander Report, to the competition stifling weapons which could
drive a thriving independent line such as Isbrandtsen to the brink of ruin. If the
United States is to have a merchant marine capable of competing with the fleets
of the world, the courts must continue to disallow devices which infringe on
competition while serving no pressing commercial need. Latin America will do
much toward laying to rest the catch-all goal of "stability."
Civil Rights-Jurisdiction Under Section 1343(3) of Title 28, United
States Code-The Lynching of Hague and Eisen.-In 1968 the appellant,
Dorothy Lynch, arranged for her employer to deposit ten dollars of her sixty-
nine dollar weekly salary in a savings bank. The following year, the appellee,
Household Finance Corporation, in preparation for a suit against the appellant
on a note, garnished her savings account under a Connecticut law1 providing
for such pre-judicial garnishment. Having received neither notice nor an oppor-
tunity to be heard, Mrs. Lynch brought a class action in a federal district court
"against [state] sheriffs who levy on bank accounts and against creditors who
invoke the garnishment statute."2 The complaint challenged the validity of the
Connecticut statute under the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment and sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant
to section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code 3 and its jurisdictional counter-
part, section 1343(3) of Title 28, United States Code.4 Holding that it had
jurisdiction only where personal and not merely property rights were involved,
a three judge district court dismissed the action. The three judge court also
held that section 2283 of Title 28, United States Code,5 prohibited enjoining
1. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-329 (Supp. 1972-73).
2. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 539-40 (1972).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . .. "
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The section provides: "A court of the United States may not
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state court proceedings, including garnishment actions.0 On appeal, 7 the United
States Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that section 1343(3) did not
distinguish between personal rights and property rights and that the garnish-
ment action was not a judicial proceeding; therefore, neither of these grounds
required dismissal. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
One of the most expansive grants of federal jurisdiction is section 1343(3)
of Title 28, United States Code, which deals with rights arising under section
1983. Both of these sections originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 8 a
post-Civil War act passed under the enabling clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Initially the courts indicated that jurisdiction under section 1343(3) was
limited to cases in which the wrong alleged was the deprivation of civil rights
created by the 1871 Act. In 1884, in Carter v. GreenhowO and Pleasants v.
Greenhow'° the Court declared that protection of contracts was not a right
directly conferred or secured by the Constitution and did not therefore fall
within the orbit of the 1871 Act."' Similarly, in Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing
Co. 12 the Court announced that the predecessor of section 1343(3) "refer[red]
to civil rights only'- 3 and would not apply to the state tax question raised in
the case. However, discrimination in employment, attacked as violating equal
protection rights, was generally recognized by the courts as an adequate basis
for jurisdiction.' 4
The courts thus far had avoided defining those rights which would fall within
the section, confining themselves to narrowly circumscribed decisions on each
individual case. In 1939, Mr. Justice Stone, in his concurring opinion to Hague
v. CIO,15 attempted to limit the breadth of section 1343(3) by resolving a
supposed conflict between that statute and section 1331 of Title 28, United
States Code,' 6 the "general federal question statute" which unlike section
1343 (3) has a minimum jurisdictional amount requirement.' 7 The plaintiffs in
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate Its
judgments."
6. See note 70 infra for a discussion of the disposition of this issue on appeal.
7. Appeals from a three judge district court are taken directly to the United States Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
8. Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The Act was also known as the
Ku Klux Klan Act. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
9. 114 U.S. 317 (1884).
10. 114 U.S. 323 (1884).
11. 114 U.S. at 322.
12. 176 U.S. 68 (1900).
13. Id. at 72.
14. See, e.g., Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
15. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."
17. At present the minimum jurisdictional amount is ten thousand dollars. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1970).
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Hague sought to enjoin city officials from enforcing an ordinance requiring a
permit for public assembly. The assembly was to be for the purpose of explain-
ing citizens' rights under the National Labor Relations Act. The injunction was
granted although there was some dispute within the Court as to whether the
violated rights of freedom of speech and assembly were protected by the "privi-
leges and immunities" clause or, as Mr. Justice Stone maintained, by the due
process clause.18
More significantly, however, Mr. Justice Stone determined that since juris-
dictional amount clearly did not apply to civil rights cases, jurisdiction under
the civil rights section existed only when the right involved was "incapable of
pecuniary valuation."' 9 From this evolved the rule that section 1343(3) covered
infringements of "personal liberty, not dependent for [their] existence upon
the infringement of property rights .... 112
This distinction was adopted by most of the lower federal courts despite
widespread criticism2 ' that the test "appears to be contrary to both the language
and the spirit of [28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)] and the Civil Rights Act of 1871.2' -
In 1943 the Jehovah's Witnesses brought two actions claiming that certain city
ordinances, which required a license for solicitation of merchandise, violated
their rights of free speech and of religion.2 3 Applying the personal liberty-
property right distinction, the Court upheld jurisdiction despite the fact that
the statute was framed in terms of a non-discriminatory licensing requirement-
undeniably a financial and therefore property oriented regulation. These cases
foreshadowed the problems which were to arise repeatedly in the application of
the Stone test. The right to a license, like most rights, has a dual nature, being
neither exclusively personal nor exclusively property related. Even the right to
a jury trial, an indisputably personal right, takes on property aspects when
coupled with a claim for damages. Such was the case in Bottox v. Lindsley "
wherein the Tenth Circuit, citing Hague, upheld jurisdiction.
18. 307 U.S. at 521-26 (Stone, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 530.
20. Id. at 531. In formulating this rule Mr. Justice Stone relied on the earlier cases of
Truax v. Raich and Crane v. Johnson as authority for his rule, observing that in each the
"gist of the cause of action" was a personal rather than a property injury. Id. He failed to
note, however, that even in areas of pure personal liberty, the damages may be capable of
valuation as was certainly true in the two employment cases which he cited as authority.
See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Laufer, Hague v. C.I.O.: Mr. Justice Stone's Test of Federal Jurisdiction-
A Reappraisal, 19 Buffalo L. Rev. 547 (1970); Comment, Civil Procedure: Section 1343(3)
Jurisdiction and the Property-Personal Right Distinction, 1970 Duke L. J. 819; Comment,
The 'Property Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction-Confusion Compounded, 43
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1208 (1968); Comment, Another and Hopefully Final Look at the Property
-Personal Liberty Distinction of Section 1343(3), 24 Vand. L. Rev. 990 (1971); Note, 49
B.U.L. Rev. 377 (1969); Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 (1953).
22. Laufer, supra note 21, at 551.
23. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 US. 105 (1943).
24. 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949).
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In the 1969 case of Eisen v. Eastman,25 Judge Friendly strongly supported
the Hague distinction by ruling that a landlord's reduction of income under a
rent control law constituted an injury to property only, rather than deprivation
of property without due process of law as the plaintiff maintained. Judge Friendly
avoided detailed analysis of the test, relying instead on his instinct that there
was "something essentially right about it."'26 He felt that there was indeed a need
both to distinguish "the overlap between 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(3)"27 and, as he pointed out in a later case, to avoid "the tidal wave of actions
under the civil rights statute. '28 Eisen was so powerfully supportive of Hague
that by 1970 the Fourth Circuit relied on it without question, dismissing a
plaintiff's claim while at the same time acknowledging that he had been "deprived
of his property without due process of law."12
Thus, by 1970 it was all but uniformly assumed that where the right allegedly
denied "concern[ed] a property or monetary right, the.., amount in controversy
must exceed $10,000 .... "30 One source of this conviction was a series of tax
challenges brought under section 1343(3) in which jurisdiction was repeatedly
denied.3 ' In a 1968 tax case, Hornbeak v. Hamm,3 2 the majority found that the
plaintiff alleged only a "property right" rather than a "civil right." Judge John-
son wrote a strong dissent in which he refused to accept the Hague rule 3 and
drew attention to another Fifth Circuit case34 which had seemingly rejected the
Stone rule by finding jurisdiction in a liquor license case.
However, Judge Friendly noted in Eisen that "cases involving denials or
25. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
26. Id. at 565.
27. Id.
28. Negron v. Wallace, 436 F.2d 1139, 1141 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998 (1971).
29. Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 436 F.2d 342, 343 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, vacated and remanded mem., for reconsideration in light of Lynch, 405 U.S. 1036
(1972). In Weddle, prison guards had taken several items of personal property from the
plaintiff on the grounds that they were contraband. The confiscated items had in fact been
purchased at the prison commissary. See also Howard v. Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.
1967).
30. Spears v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1970), wherein it was claimed
that the state's refusal to pay on a bond issued during the Civil War constituted a deprivation
of property without due process.
31. Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967); Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp.
549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 9 (1968); Abernathy v. Carpenter, 208
F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 373 U.S. 241 (1963). Contra, Joe Louis
Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. IlI. 1965), in which the court specifically
rejected Hague, maintaining that property rights are equally entitled to constitutional
protection: "rnjeither logic nor policy compels the conclusion that property rights are less
deserving of protection under the Constitution and Civil Rights Act than are human
freedoms." Id. at 354.
32. 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 9 (1968).
33. Id. at 554. (Johnson, C.J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent discussed Bussle v.
Long, 383 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1967), which was "based upon" Hague. Id. at 552.
34. Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen, 389 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1968).
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revocations of licenses,"3 5 like dismissals from public employment, are analogous
to "a deprivation of the personal liberty to pursue a calling of one's choice."3 0
Thus in 1970, the Second Circuit sustained jurisdiction where a plaintiff's real
estate broker's license had been suspended. 37 These cases do not "fit snugly
under the Stone formula."3a As a rule, a stricter standard of personal harm was
required in employment cases before jurisdiction under section 1343(3) would
be sustained.
Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority39 was the first post-Eiscn employ-
ment case considered in the Second Circuit. In Taylor jurisdiction was sustained
and the right to work was given personal liberty status ° However, later the
same year, the Second Circuit rejected Taylor in Tichon v. Hardcr.4 1 There a
probationary social worker was discharged without a hearing. The court relied
on a Connecticut law under which probationary employees are not entitled to
a hearing or notice in dismissal actions 2 The court reasoned that since the
plaintiff was a mere probationer no "professional reputation... [was] at stake,"43
and therefore her "ability to engage in [her] occupation"4 4 had not been de-
stroyed nor was "a right of personal liberty... involved."'4 Unless "underlying
35. 421 F.2d at 565. The court spoke of "all kinds of licenses ranging from automobile
drivers through liquor licensees to accountants, doctors and lawyers, and the imposition of
terms on or the refusal of building permits or application for changes in zoning ... 
Id. at 568 n.13.
36. Id. at 565; see, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964), wherein a
liquor license was at issue.
37. Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970).
38. 421 F.2d at 565. Rights which Judge Friendly found to "fit snugly" were the right
to vote (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)) and freedom of speech (citing Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 US. 367 (1951)). Id. at 564-65.
39. 309 F. Supp. 785 (ED.N.Y. 1970), aftd, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970).
40. Taylor had been discharged from his job as inspector, the court found that a substan-
tial due process question arose "when the official responsible for prosecution . . . casts the
deciding vote" on the board reviewing the earlier order for removal. Id. at 788. The court
observed that "Eclertainly it cannot seriously be contended that a man's liberty is not
diminished when he is denied the option of remaining in a government job vital to his own
and his family's sustenance." Id. at 789.
41. 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-202 (1969), as amended, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-202
(Supp. 1972).
43. 438 F.2d at 1399.
44. Id. at 1402. The implication is that had the plaintiff been tenured, a "personal liberty"
question would have arisen. But see Kiernan v. Lindsay, 334 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd men. 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), rehearing denied, wherein a tenured policeman was relegated
to probationary status for one year without a hearing. There the mere fact of tenure was
insufficient to yield 1343(3) jurisdiction.
45. 438 F.2d at 1402. Clearly distinguishable is Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672
(2d Cir. 1966), in which a physician discharged from his public position for racial dis-
crimination sought and gained 1343(3) jursdiction because of the probability of permanent
damage to both his reputation and his career.
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interests" 46 falling within the first eight amendments are involved, the court
indicated that it would not find the right abrogated to be one of personal
liberty.47 Failing this, the claim must be dismissed because it alleges merely the
loss of a property right. 48
Welfare rights cases have more consistently been accorded jurisdiction under
section 1343(3) than either employment or licensing questions. This liberality
has resulted primarily from Goldberg v. Kelly,49 a Supreme Court case in which
jurisdiction was sustained although the right asserted was unmistakably prop-
erty related-the right to receive money. Since the Goldberg Court premised
its findings on the conviction that procedural safeguards are as essential to
welfare rights as to property rights, that decision leads to the inescapable con-
clusion that property rights hold a more elevated position than the Stone formula
indicated.
In Johnson v. Harder0 the Second Circuit, somewhat ambiguously, adopted
the Goldberg position by interpreting welfare entitlements as "some sort of right
to exist in society, a personal right under the Stone formula."'51 The Fourth
Circuit has applied the welfare reasoning in finding jurisdiction in a dispute
over the termination of a public housing lease.52 In a similar problem the
Second Circuit has also taken jurisdiction, while juggling to keep the Stone dis-
tinction alive. 8 The court found that the termination of a lease without a
hearing violated the plaintiff's right to due process, clearly a civil right. 4 Thus
by 1971 it was clear that the personal liberty-property right distinction was,
at least in theory, well entrenched, especially in the Second Circuit, " [p] ending
further instructions from the Supreme Court ....
46. 438 F.2d at 1400.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1403. Contra, Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953), wherein
public school teachers gained jurisdiction in an action on a salary dispute; Penn v. Stumpf,
308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970), wherein alleged discriminatory hiring practices gave
rise both to 1343(3) jurisdiction and a judicial criticism of the property distinction.
49. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In an even earlier case, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) the
Supreme Court found jurisdiction under § 1343(3) when the plaintiff's welfare benefits were
cut off because she had had sexual relations with a man not the father of her children.
S0. 438 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 12. Contra, Roberts v. Harder, 440 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
vacated and remanded mem., for reconsideration in light of Lynch, 405 U.S. 1037 (1972),
wherein plaintiff's rent was sent directly to the landlord and deducted from plaintiff's welfare
check. The circuit court, citing the Johnson case, found no unconstitutional deprivation
since the plaintiff's subsistence had not been threatened. 440 F.2d at 1230.
52. Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
53. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 864 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
54. Id. at 864. But see note 29 supra and accompanying text for inconsistency within the
Second Circuit.
55. Tucker v. Maher, 441 F.2d 740, 741 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, vacated and re-
manded mem., for reconsideration in light of Lynch, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972).
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When Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. was presented on appeal to the
Supreme Court last term, it provided an ideal opportunity for the resolution of
the conflict over section 1343(3). Moreover, it was an opportunity which the
Court could neither avoid nor reject since the appeal from the decision of a
three judge district court was an appeal of right.56 The case squarely presented
the property rights issue to the Court. The garnishment of Mrs. Lynch's bank
account under color of state law had allegedly deprived Mrs. Lynch of her rights
to due process and to equal protection under the law.57 The only issue to be
determined was whether a right in property, here a bank account, fell properly
within the scope of section 1343 (3).
The decision in Lynch resolved the uncertainty and confusion which had
resulted from Justice Stone's formula and the various interpretations assigned
to it, by "expressly reject[ing] that distinction." 8 In delivering the opinion of
the Court,59 Mr. Justice Stewart reasoned that there exists, in fact, no conflict
between section 1331 and section 1343(3).00 He found that the limiting words
in section 1343 (3)--"under color of state law"--adequately separate those issues
which fall under the respective statutes.0 l Furthermore, he noted that "contraction
of [section] 1343(3) jurisdiction is not supported by the legislative history of
[section] 1331,1162 nor was section 1331 intended to narrow civil rights jurisdic-
tion under section 1343 (3),63 especially since " 'repeals by implication are not
favored.' ,4 He concluded therefrom that the "descendants . . . of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 must be given the meaning and sweep that their origins and
their language dictate." 65
The Court disposed of the property right limitation placed on the statute even
more vigorously by finding it contrary to congressional intent.00 Property rights
are neither secondary rights nor purely pecuniary rights, but are essential to
other civil rights and vital to the value and meaning of the fourteenth amendment
under which section 1343(3) was enacted.6 7 The Court maintained that it had
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). See note 7 supra.
57. 405 U.S. at 540.
58. Id. at 542.
59. All the Justices concurred in the disposition of the § 1343(3) issue, Mr. Justice Powel
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
60. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
61. 405 U.S. at 547.
62. Id. at 548.
63. Moreover, other exemptions from § 1331's minimum jurisdictional amount have
since been drafted. Id. at 549-50 n.17. The concern with congestion in the courts is in reality
confined to diversity cases which are the principal source of the problem. Id. at 550.
64. Id. at 549 (citing Jones v. Alfred I. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); Posadas v.
National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
65. 405 U.S. at 549.
66. Id. at 543. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-90 (1961), for the history of the
section and congressional debate thereon. See also Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App.
69 (1871) where the rights sought to be protected were described as "the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind ....
67. 405 U.S. at 544.
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never accepted the personal liberties-property rights dichotomy, distinguishing
cases in which it had appeared to endorse the formula as state tax cases,0 8 which
the federal courts are obliged to avoid under the abstention doctrine if there
exists a state remedy.69 The Court concluded this aspect of the decision70 with
a reiteration of its belief that there is a "fundamental interdependence . . . be-
tween the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property." 7'
Finally, the Court rejected the Stone limitation on section 1343(3) for "the
virtual impossibility of applying it."12 Mr. Justice Stewart spoke of the" 'mixed'
cases in which both personal and property rights are implicated,"78 and cited
many of the cases discussed above as examples of the confusion and illogic
generated by the test.74
The impact of this decision has already been making itself evident .7 Having
rejected the personal liberties-property rights distinction, it was unnecessary for
the Lynch Court to undertake a convoluted analysis of the plaintiff's deprivation
in order to fit it into the personal liberty category.70 As a result of Lynch, cases
68. Id. at 542-43 n.6. See also note 31 supra and accompanying text.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
70. The remainder of the opinion dealt with a discussion of § 2283, the majority finding
that the statute did not bar the issuance of an injunction since the garnishment action was
not a judicial proceeding in a state court within the meaning of § 2283. See note 5 supra.
For a further discussion of this problem see Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972)
wherein an injunction against an election recount was found not to conflict with § 2283
since the state court was determined to have acted in a non-judicial capacity in granting the
petition for a recount. Mr. Justice White's dissent in Lynch, in which Chief Justice Burger
and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined, dealt solely with this aspect of the decision.
71. 405 U.S. at 552.
72. Id. at 550-51.
73. Id. at 551.
74. Id. passim.
75. The following cases have been vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Lynch: Tucker v. Maher, 441 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, vacated and remanded
mer., 405 U.S. 1052 (1972) (pre-judgment attachment challenge); Roberts v. Harder,
440 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, vacated and remanded mew., 405 U.S. 1037
(1972) (welfare question); Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 439 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. granted, vacated and remanded mew., 405 U.S. 1052 (1972) (zoning challenge) ;
Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, vacated
and remanded mem., 405 U.S. 1036 (1972) (prisoner deprived of property); Lung v. Jones,
322 F. Supp. 1067 (D.N.M. 1971), cert. granted, vacated and remanded mer., 405 U.S. 1051
(1972) (state tax challenge). But see Kiernan v. Lindsay, 334 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd mew., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 1076 (1972), which was affirmed
in a memorandum decision only four days after Lynch was decided and to which a rehearing
was denied. Assigning an explanation to this denial of rehearing would be purely speculative;
but it should probably not be read as a limitation on or a narrowing of Lynch. See note 44
supra.
76. The plaintiff had tried such an analysis in the court below (318 F. Supp. at 1113),
relying on Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), which had found that
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brought under section 1343(3) can be simply and economically disposed of on
their merits without becoming enmeshed in the web of tangled reasoning that
has long surrounded the jurisdictional statute.
Constitutional Law-"'Liberalized" Abortion Statute Held Constitutional.-
Plaintiff, the appointed guardian ad litem for the infant "Roe" and all similarly
situated members of a class of unborn infants of less than twenty-four weeks'
gestation scheduled for abortion in New York State public hospitals, sought to
have New York's "liberalized" abortion statute' declared unconstitutional, as
violative of the constitutional rights of his wards. Specifically, plaintiff contended
that a fetus is a legal person under the United States Constitution and therefore
could not be deprived of life without due process or equal protection under the
law. In the initial judicial determination, plaintiff obtained a temporary injunc-
tion from a New York Supreme Court2 against the performing of any abortional
acts. 3 On appeal the Appellate Division reversed and vacated the injunction,
upholding the constitutionality of the statute.4 The New York Court of Appeals
prejudgment garnishment of a debtor's wages violated due process and gave rise to possmble
severe hardship. The Lynch Court noted this now unnecessary attempt to characterize the
garnishment as endangering plaintiff's ability to purchase necessities of daily life. 405 U.S.
at 551.
For comparison the Court cited Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
wherein the court assumed jurisdiction in a dispute over distraint proceedings for the sale
of plaintiff's goods under the color of state law. The grey area appears to be, as was true
in the welfare cases, the subsistence level or level of necessity. Lynch obviates this subjective
and difficult categorization.
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1967), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972-
73). The amendment was enacted as chapter 127 of the Laws of 1970, eff. July 1, 1970.
See note 11 infra for a more complete legislative history.
2. Byrn v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., N.Y. Sup. Ct. (Queens County,
Jan. 7, 1972), rev'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 329 N.YS.2d 722 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d
194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
3. The injunction provided for an exception where the mother's life was endangered,
an exception made previously by the older "restrictive" New York abortion statute, and in
fact by every state's older abortion laws. According to Denzer, Supplementary Practice
Commentary, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.05(3), at 110-12 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73) [herein-
after cited as Denzer], as of 1965 forty-nine of the fifty-two American jurisdictions limited
legal abortions to those necessary to save the mother's life and the other three also allowed
abortions to preserve the mother's health. Id. at 110. For a discussion of the similar common
law exception, see R. Perkins, Criminal Law 145-49 (2d ea. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Perkins].
Exactly what may be encompassed under the exception "for the preservation of the
woman's life" is a matter of judicial interpretation. For a recent case holding that such
exception does not encompass mental or psychiatric grounds, see People ex rel. Hanrahan v.
White, 52 IlL 2d 70, 285 N.E.2d 129 (1972).
4. 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d
887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
affirmed, preferring to leave the question of a fetus's legal personality to the
judgment of the legislature. Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospitals
Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
At common law, the abortion of a "quick" child5 was a crime, and generally
all older statutes dealing with the subject placed severe restrictions on the per-
forming of abortions. 7 However, within the past few years there has been a
definite two-pronged tendency toward liberalization of abortion restrictions: on
the one hand, restrictive statutes have increasingly met resistance in the courts,8
and on the other, several states have enacted statutes which permit abortions
more freely.9 The New York statute attacked in Byrn is illustrative of the
latter,10 in that it permits "abortion on demand" within the first twenty-four
weeks after conception, or at any time if such seems reasonably necessary to
save the mother's life."
Because of the newness of the New York statute, Byrn was the first direct
attack on liberalized, legalized abortion in New York. However, there existed
a line of well-known New York cases dealing with the legal rights of fetuses in
different factual contexts. Woods v. Lancet 12 was the first New York case to
5. A "quick" child is defined as one so developed as to be capable of detectable movement
in the mother's womb. Black's Law Dictionary 1415 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted).
Such movements usually occur between the fourth and fifth months of pregnancy. Gaylord,
The Dilemma of Abortion, 77 Case & Com., July-Aug. 1972, at 19, 21 n.9.
6. E.g., Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 88 (1872). See also Perkins 140.
7. See George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform, 17 West.
Res. L. Rev. 371 (1965) (part of a symposium on Abortion and the Law); Stern, Abortion:
Reform and the Law, 59 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 84 (1968).
8. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 28-37 infra and accompanying text.
9. From 1966 through 1970, 14 states enacted amendatory legislation relaxing their abor-
tion laws. Denzer 110.
10. The current New York statute provides: "§ 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related
offenses; definitions of terms
3. 'Justifiable abortional act.' An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a
female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief
that such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission of an abortlonal act
upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a duly licensed physician (1) that
such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, (2) within twenty-four weeks from the com-
mencement of her pregnancy. The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable
when she believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting under a
reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks
from the commencement of her pregnancy."
11. The legislative history of the New York statute is both dramatic and significant. After
easy passage by the New York State Senate, the bill failed its first test in the State Assembly
by a vote of 73-70 (with 76 votes needed for passage); however, the bill was kept alive
for another vote by some parliamentary maneuvering. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 8.
Upon the revote, the bill passed 76-73, after the "dramatic last-minute switching of a single
vote in the Assembly . . . ." N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1970, at 1, cos. 6-8.
12. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
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accord a right of recovery in tort to a child subsequently born alive for injuries
received while it was in a viable' 3 state in the wvomb. 14 Woods was extended to
encompass injuries to "nonviable" fetuses as well, in Kelly v. Gregory,10 since
separability of mother and child begins at conception, and, therefore, any dis-
tinction between "viable" and "nonviable" was artificial.10
The fact that the child must be born alive in order to have a cause of action
for prenatal injuries was underscored in Endresz v. Friedberg.17 There, the
personal representative of a stillborn fetus which had died because of injuries
received in the womb was declared to have no right of recovery under New York's
wrongful death statute,'8 since the statute applied only to "decedents," i.e.,
persons necessarily born alive.' 9 The court discussed at length the rights and
protections afforded to fetuses in New York and concluded that:
[A]lthough an unborn child has certain rights under property law, his enjoyment of
13. "[The] term [viable] is applied to a newly-born infant, and especially to one prema-
turely born, which is not only born alive, but in such a state of organic development as to
make possible the continuance of its life." Black's Law Dictionary 1737 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Hence, the term is applied to a fetus so developed as to be capable of independent life outside
the womb. For information on the biological processes which take place after conception,
and their possible legal ramifications, see Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality?,
46 Notre Dame Law. 5, 7-9 (1970).
14. Thus Woods did not follow the earlier logic of Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220,
133 N.E. 567 (1921), which had held that an unborn child has no cause of action for
prenatal injuries. The court in Drobner had relied on Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14
(1884), in which Judge (later Justice) Holmes reasoned "that, as the unborn child was a
part of the mother at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not too remote
to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her .... " Id. at 17. The Woods court based
its abandonment of Drobner-Dietrich on the effects of more recent decisions, since "the basic
reason for Drobner v. Peters was absence of precedent." 303 N.Y. at 353, 102 N.E.2d at 693.
15. 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953).
16. Id. at 543-45, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98. For a discussion of cases from other jurisdictions
on the question of liability for prenatal injuries, see Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971).
17. 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
18. N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
19. Authority from other jurisdictions both in accord and opposed to the New York
decision to deny a wrongful death recovery to stillborns is collected at rn. 1-2, 24 N.Y.2d at
482, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 68. Accord, Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95,
268 P.2d 178 (3d Dist. 1954); Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 163 N.E.2d 912
(1960); Powers v. City of Troy, 4 Mich. App. 572, 145 N.W.2d 418 (1966); Drabbels v.
Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, S0 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d
140 (1964); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 423 (1966); Padillow v. Elrod,
424 P.2d 16 (Okla. Sup. CL 1967); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964);
Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958). Contra, Gullborg v. Rizzo,
331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557
(1956); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143; 368 P.2d 1 (1962); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman,
234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Mhinn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838
(1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Fowler v. Woodward,
244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mdut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis.
2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
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those rights is contingent upon his being born alive. . . In other words, even if, as
science and theology teach, the child begins a separate "life" from the moment of
conception, it is clear that, "except in so far as is necessary to protect the child's own
rights" the law has never considered the unborn foetus as having a separate "juridical
existence" or a legal personality or identity "until it sees the light of day."20
A contrary New York case which upheld fetal rights was Robin v. Village o]
Hempstead.2 1 There, a village ordinance forbidding abortions unless performed
in state-licensed hospitals was challenged. The court, in dictum, discussed the
legal right to life of a fetus, and concluded that such right "supersedes even
the religious freedom of the mother .... -22 In so holding, the court relied on
the determination, set out in Kelly v. Gregory,23 that a fetus has a separate
biological and, hence, legal identity from its mother.
Robin invoked the "transfusion" cases, which have dealt with whether or
not a pregnant woman can be forced to have a blood transfusion necessary to
protect the life of her unborn child. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson,24 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "the unborn
child is entitled to the law's protection 2 5 and that the transfusion should thus
be made. The court relied on Smith v. Brennan,20 another New Jersey case
which had held that a fetus was a separate legal entity and thus, if born alive,
entitled to recover for a prenatal injury. While these transfusion cases are not
20. 24 N.Y.2d at 485, 248 N.E.2d at 904-05, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). As for the fetal property rights discussed in Endresz, one New York case
on point is In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d 841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959), wherein
the New York Court of Appeals held that a fetus is not a "person beneficially interested" In
a trust (within the meaning of N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 23 (McKinney 1949), as amended,
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 23 (McKinney 1962)), and therefore a trust may be revoked without
the fetus's "consent." However, the court pointed to other areas of property rights where
the state legislature expressly protected fetuses when the prior interest in the property ended;
for example, under section 6-5.7 of the N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law (McKinney 1967)
(formerly, at the time of the Peabody decision, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 56 (McKinney 1945)),
when a future estate is limited to heirs, distributees, or issue, "posthumous children shall
be entitled to take in the same manner as if living at the death of their ancestors." 5 N.Y.2d
at 547, 158 N.E.2d at 844-45, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70.
21. 66 Misc. 2d 482, 321 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 38 App.
Div. 2d 758, 329 N.Y.S.2d 678 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 285 N.E.2d 285, 334 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1972).
22. 66 Misc. 2d at 485, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
23. 282 App. Div. at 543-44, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98 (dictum); see notes 15-16 supra
and accompanying text.
24. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
25. Id. at 422, 201 A.2d at 538; accord, Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d
140 (1961). See also In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), in which it was held that the state may require
a woman to have a blood transfusion necessary to save her life so that her seven month-old
child should not be left without a mother.
26. 31 NJ. 353, 363-64, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 502-03, 504-05 (1960), overruling Stemmer
v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942).
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exactly on point, the appellate division in its Byrn opinion conceded that they
"do establish, however, that the State has intervened before birth to protect
the life of the unborn child endangered by the exercise of a constitutional right
[e.g., the right of free exercise of religion] asserted by the mother." 2 '
However, there is contrary authority from several courts in other jurisdictions
which, in considering restrictive abortion statutes, have championed the mother's
constitutional right to choose whether or not to bear children, a right held by
these courts to override any right to life of the fetus.28 For example, in People v.
Belous' 29 the California Supreme Court overturned that portion of the California
Penal Code which prohibited abortion, on the grounds that the words "necessary
to preserve [the life of the mother]" 0 were unconstitutionally vague and viola-
tive of legislative intent. In dictum, the court suggested that "[t]he funda-
mental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children follows from the
[United States] Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledgment of a
'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family, and sex."3 '
Similarly, certain lower federal courts have invalidated restrictive abortion
statutes as unconstitutional invasions of a woman's private right to refuse to
bear a child. In Babbitz v. McCann,32 which overturned a Wisconsin statut 3
that made it a crime to perform abortions except to save the life of the mother,
the court said:
Upon a balancing of the relevant interests, we hold that a woman's right to refuse to
carry an embryo during the early months of pregnancy may not be invaded by the state
27. 38 App. Div. 2d at 326, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 731-32.
28. For a general discussion of cases dealing with the validity, under the Federal Constitu-
tion, of abortion laws, see Annot., 28 L. Ed. 2d 1053 (1972).
29. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 915
(1970), noted in 48 Texas L. Rev. 937 (1970).
30. Id. at 960, 458 P.2d at 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 357. The statute held unconstitutional
was Cal. Penal Code § 274 (West Supp. 1968), as amended, Cal. Penal Code § 274 (West
1970) and Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25950-25955.5 (West Supp. 1972).
31. 71 Cal. 2d at 963-64, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. The United States
Supreme Court cases relied upon were Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state may
not prohibit interracial marriages); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.. 479 (1965) (state
may not make it a crime to instruct married persons in the use of contraceptives) ; Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (state sterilization statute declared invalid; marriage and
procreation are "basic rights") ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510 (1925) (state statute
that required parents to send children to public schools interfered with parents' right to
decide children's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state statute forbidding
the teaching of foreign languages to schoolchildren also interfered with basic liberty). Cali-
fornia cases relied upon were Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) and
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st Dist. 1967).
32. 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 400 U.. 1,
injunction granted, 320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated and remanded for recon-
sideration on procedural grounds, 402 U.S. 903 (1971). The case is discussed in Fox, Abortion:
A Question of Right or Wrong?, 57 A.B.A.J. 667 (1971).
33. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.04 (1958).
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without a more compelling public necessity 4 than is reflected in the statute in question,
When measured against the claimed "rights" of an embryo of four months or less, we
hold that the mother's right transcends that of such an embryo 85
The Babbitz court relied on both the ninth amendment and those Supreme
Court cases which have formulated a right to privacy and to one's own person, 0
as justifying a woman's right to abortion.8 7
However, roughly an equal number of federal courts have upheld restrictive
abortion statutes, generally on the grounds that the fetus had a constitutionally
protected right to life which outweighed any rights of the mother. For example,
in Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,88 a three-judge district
court upheld a statute which authorized the revocation of a doctor's license if the
physician performed an abortion not necessary to preserve the life of the mother.
The court noted that, while a woman may have a constitutional right to deter-
mine whether to become pregnant, such right does not allow the destruction of a
34. For a compilation of abortion cases which have explicitly touched upon whether
restrictive state abortion statutes are supported by a "compelling state interest," see Annot.,
28 L. Ed. 2d 1053, 1070-76 (1972), which discusses cases that have found both for and against
the existence of such an interest. For: Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (NJ). Ohio
1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 936,
probable jurisdiction postponed to a hearing on the merits, 402 U.S. 941 (1971); Rosen v.
Louisiana State 3d. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La.), appeal filed, 39
U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1970) (No. 70-42). Against: Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385
(N.D. Ill.), appeal docketed sub noms. Hanrahan v. Doe and Heffernan v. Doe, 39 U.S.L.W.
3438 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1971) (Nos. 1522 & 1523); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex.
1970), probable jurisdiction postponed to a hearing on the merits, 402 U.S. 941 (1971);
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), vacated and remanded for reconsideration
on procedural grounds, 402 U.S. 903 (1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
35. 310 F. Supp. at 301 (footnote added).
36. For an enumeration of the cases relied upon see note 31 supra.
37. Accord, Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn.), petition for cert. filed,
41 U.S.L.W. 3136 (U.S. July 10, 1972); Doe v Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (Nfl. Ill.), appeal
docketed sub noms. Hanrahan v. Doe and Heffernan v. Doe, 39 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Mar.
29, 1971) (Nos. 1522 & 1523); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), probable
jurisdiction postponed to a hearing on the merits, 402 U.S. 941 (1971); cf. Doe v. Bolton,
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 936, probable jurisdiction
postponed to a hearing on the merits, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (ninth amendment right to privacy
encompasses decision to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, but state may assert "legitimate
area of control short of an invasion of the personal right of initial decision." 319 F. Supp.
at 1055).
In addition, both Planned Parenthood Comm., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231,
375 P.2d 719 (1962), and Sturgis v. Attorney Gen., 358 Mass. 37, 260 N.E.2d 687 (1970),
dealt with whether state police power was unduly extended by state statutes that curtailed the
counseling and advertising of abortions and birth control. In both cases, the courts upheld
the statutes as constitutional.
38. 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La.), appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1970)
(No. 70-42).
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created fetus. 9 The Babbitz view was held to be neither constitutionally man-
dated nor in line with the "theories of life and being" held by most Americans
To date the United States Supreme Court has not passed directly on the issue
of whether abortion, other than for reasons of the mother's safety, is constitu-
tionally permitted, but it has recently ruled that a restrictive abortion statute
was not unconstitutionally vague when it made reference to the mother's
"health.141 The Court refused to comment on the district court's suggestion that
"as a secular matter a woman's liberty... may well include the right to remove
an unwanted child at least in early stages of pregnancy.1 42
Faced with these conflicting precedents, the New York courts, in adjudicating
the Byrn case, could find "no case directly in point which controls our deter-
mination." 43 The appellate division, after a thorough discussion of previous case
law, dealt with the constitutional issue of a fetus's right to life in an historical
fashion:
39. 318 F. Supp. at 1222-23.
40. Id. at 1231; accord, Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C.), appeal filed,
40 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. July 17, 1971) (Corkey is significant in that it anticipates Byrn's
deference to the determinations of the legislature. The Corkey court noted that the choice
between the mother's interests and those of the fetus "is a value judgment not committed to
the discretion of judges but reposing instead in the representative branch of government."
Id. at 1253-54); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.]D. Ohio 1970).
In addition, one further pro-abortion argument that has uniformly met with disfavor in
the courts is the equal protection argument, which contends that restrictive state abortion
statutes should be overturned since they discriminate against the poor and the nonwhite.
For example, the court in Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp.
1217 (E.D. La.), appeal fied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1970) (No. 70-42) said:
"[We have considered the argument that an affluent woman, whether by legal or illegal
means, has a better opportunity than a poor one to obtain an abortion at little risk to her
life or health. We are, however, unwilling to equate the types of inequality suggested [here]
with a denial of a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, we reject
plaintiff's equal protection argument." 318 F. Supp. at 1232 n.19. For cases in accord with
the Rosen majority's view see Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.). Ohio 1970);
Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 936, probable
jurisdiction postponed to a hearing on the merits, 402 U.S. 941 (1971); Sturgis v. Attorney
Gen., 358 Mass. 37, 260 N.E.2d 687 (1970). But see Judge Cassibry's dissenting opinion in
Rosen, 318 F. Supp. at 1243, which cited statistics indicating that deaths from illegal abor-
tions strike mostly the poor nonwhite. For a further discussion of the equal protection argu-
ment, and cases which discuss it as it applies to statutes which allegedly discriminate against
nonphysicians, see Annot., 28 L. Ed. 2d 1053, 1082-84 (1972).
41. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), rev'g 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
The statute in question was D.C. Code Ann. § 22-201 (1967). The Supreme Court has al-o
dismissed appeals or denied certiorari in a number of other cases which unsuccessfully chal-
lenged restrictive state abortion statutes, e.g., Abodeely v. State, 179 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa Sup.
Ct. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 936 (1971); Vuitch v. State, 10 Md. App. 389, 271 A.2d
371 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 868 (1971); Lashley v. State, 10 Md. App. 136, 268 A.2d
502 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 991 (1971).
42. 305 F. Supp. at 1035.
43. 38 App. Div. 2d at 325, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
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We have seen no indication that the framers of the Fifth Amendment intended to
include fetal life when they provided that no "person" shall be deprived of life without
due process. In construing a constitution or any part of it, a court should look to the
law as it existed at the time it was adopted. It has been said that our Federal Con-
stitution should be construed with reference to the common law of England ....
[I]t was generally believed at common law that the unborn child was physically a part
of the mother and legal personality was accorded to it merely as a fictional device in
anticipation of birth. We think it unlikely, therefore, that the framers of the Fifth
Amendment... gave any consideration to whether a child en ventre sa mere was within
the protection of that amendment.44
However, in resolving the case the appellate division found the "decisive" con-
sideration to be the strong presumption of constitutionality inherent in state
statutes, and deferred to the legislature the question of whether or not fetal life
is to be constitutionally protected.
45
The New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the appellate division's decision,
approached the issue of whether a fetus is a legal person with the right to life
on two levels.48 The first turned on the legal history which had been set out
in detail by the appellate division. The court of appeals recognized the line of
New York cases-Endresz, Woods, and Kelly-which had granted rights to
fetuses in certain "narrow" legal categories, but noted that "unborn children
have never been recognized as persons in the law in the whole sense."4 7 And as
for abortion itself, restrictive abortion statutes were "evidently" designed to
protect the mother and not the child:
48
It has been argued, of course, that anti-abortion laws were also designed to protect the
44. Id. at 330, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (citations omitted). Note that the old common law
view that the fetus was merely a part of its mother was specifically rejected in Kelly v.
Gregory, 282 App. Div. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98; see notes 15-16 & 23 supra.
45. "Questions of wisdom, need or appropriateness are for the Legislature and we strike
down statutes it has enacted only as a last resort and only when unconstitutionality is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt ....
"...*In resolving the important issues presented by this case, this court is not required to
weigh and choose between the competing values urged by those who support the law and
those who oppose it. The Legislature has made that determination and the court inquires only
whether the Federal Constitution permits the choice it made and whether there is a reasonable
basis for it. We answer both questions in the affirmative. In our opinion, the extent to
which fetal life should be protected 'is a value judgment not committed to the discretion of
judges but reposing instead in the representative branch of government' (Corkey v. Edwards,
322 F. Supp. 1248, 1253-1254 [V.D.N.C. 19711) .... " 38 App. Div. 2d at 330-31, 329 N.Y.S.
2d at 735-36.
46. 31 N.Y.2d at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
47. Id.
48. Id. As support, the court cited Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a
Penumbral or a Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century
Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971).
This article provides a thorough discussion of the common law aspects of the abortion
question.
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fetus; but the argument is hard to sustain so long as there have been provisions that
limited unlawful abortions to pregnancies after "quickening" and abortions have been
justified to protect the mother even though it meant destruction of the fetus.0
In any event, the court noted that historical analysis was not determinative.r0
The second level of debate was the "real one," and it dealt directly with the
question of whether a fetus is a legal person.51 The court recognized that, in the
natural or conceptual sense, a fetus can be regarded as a person, but "[i]t is
not true, however, that the legal order necessarily corresponds to the natural
order .... ,*2 Therefore, "[w] hat is a legal person is for the law, including, of
course, the Constitution, to say .... M3
The process is, indeed, circular, because it is definitional. Whether the law should accord
legal personality is a policy question which in most instances devolves on the Legisla-
ture .... That the legislative action may be wise or unwise, even unjust and violative
of principles beyond the law, does not change the legal issue or how it is to be resolved.
The point is that it is a policy determination whether legal personality should attach
and not a question of biological or "natural" correspondence." 4
The court also exposed what it considered an inconsistency in plaintiff's position:
plaintiff would allow abortion to save the mother's life, but, before the law, the
mother's and fetus's lives must be co-equal, and therefore plaintiff seemingly
contradicted his own belief in the fetus's full right to life.ss
In summary, while the New York Court of Appeals recognized that there were
real issues in the case, these issues were not legal or justiciable unless the legis-
lature should provide otherwise. There is no constitutional mandate which re-
quires complete legal personality for fetuses: "the Legislature may [confer legal
personality on the unborn], or it may do something less, as it does in limited
abortion statutes, and provide some protection far short of conferring legal
personality."56
49. 31 N.Y.2d at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
50. Id. at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
51. Id. at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
52. Id. at 201, 286 N.E2d at 889, 335 N.YS.2d at 393 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 201, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
54. Id. (emphasis added). The court cited from J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the
Law 38-39 (2d ed. 1921) and G. Paton, A Text-book of Jurisprudence 353-54 (3d ed. 1964).
But cf. Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La.),
appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1970) (No. 70-42): "[Wle do not believe that
the constitutional validity of statutes turns upon whether legislators make speeches..
318 F. Supp. at 1228.
55. 31 N.Y.2d at 203, 286 N.E.2d at 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
56. Id. at 203, 286 N.E.2d at 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 395. The appellate division opinion
in Bym was followed in Klein v. Nassau County 'Medical Center, No. 72-C-386 (E.D.N.Y,
Aug. 24, 1972), where the court held that "Medicaid" must pay for the abortions of indigent
women, since an abortion may be thought of as "necessary" medical assistance. The court
declared that any question as to the validity of the permissive New York abortion statute
was settled in Byrn.
Likewise, in People v. Dobbs Ferry Medical Pavilion, Inc., 332 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
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Judges Burke and Scileppi dissented in separate opinions. Basically, they
contended that the liberalized abortion statute contravened the natural law57
and therefore could not be upheld. Further, as one dissent argued, to allow the
legislature to be the sole judge of the matter would authorize capricious changes
in the law, depending on legislative whim and changing concepts of legality. 8
The dissenters also noted that the statute may be irrational, since there are
several practical factors-the reliability of modern contraceptive devices, the
large number of families which would be willing to adopt "unwanted" babies,
and the trend toward zero population growth-which seem to undermine any
compelling state interest necessitating liberalized abortion. 9 Finally, it would
be inconsistent with earlier decisions granting the fetus certain property or tort
rights to deny it "the most valuable of all rights, which is life itself."0 °
Regardless of one's personal views on abortion, it is unfortunate that the
court of appeals based its affirmation of New York's liberal abortion statute
primarily on the chameleon of legislative action. As the dissenters pointed out,0 1
it is too easy to attack such a position by demonstrating legislative vulnerability
to changing concepts of law and morality.0 2 More importantly, Byrn squarely
1972), where the state tried to enjoin the operation of an abortion clinic for failure to
observe technical requirements of the N.Y. Pub. Health Law (McKinney 1971), the court
emphasized that the action can "in no way (relate] to or [hinge] upon a value judgment
as to abortions per se," since that question was settled in Byrn. Id. at 189.
A recent federal court case, McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751 (WID.
Pa. 1972), has also declared that a fetus is not a legal person, and cited Byrn as authority.
Id. at 753.
57. Natural law was defined as "inalienable rights that come not from the State but from
an external source of authority superior to the State which authority regulated our inalienable
liberties and with which our laws and Constitutions must now conform." 31 N.Y.2d at 208,
286 N.E.2d at 893, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (Burke, J., dissenting).
58. "The rationale of the majority opinion admits that customs do change and the Legis-
lature could, if it should in the future be the attitude of the Legislature, do away with old
folks and eliminate the great expense the aged are to the taxpayers. This, of course, would
parallel the Hitler laws which decreed the death of all the inmates of mental hospitals and
also decreed that for many purposes non-Aryans were nonpersons.
"According to the majority opinion, valid law is a merger of legislative and executive
emotions, whims and hunches-announced today and perhaps changed tomorrow. One's rights
are never permanent as the existence of the natural law is denied. The majority suggests that
all law is man made. Such a philosophy of law we know would not attract persons educated
in philosophy." Id. at 208-09, 286 N.E.2d at 893-94, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
59. Id. at 206-07, 286 N.E.2d at 892, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 397-98 (Burke, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 214, 286 N.E.2d at 897, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (Scileppi, 3., dissenting).
61. See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text.
62. This is especially true given the erratic legislative history of the New York statute.
See note 11 supra. In this regard it is interesting to note that, shortly before the New
York Court of Appeals passed on Byrn, the liberal New York statute was actually repealed
by the state legislature after acrimonious public debate. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1972, at 1,
col. 1. However, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller vetoed the repeal. N.Y. Times, May 14,
1972, at 1, col. 1.
put before the New York courts the question of whether a fetus is a "person"
within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and it is improper
for the courts to ignore their duty to define such an important constitutional
term merely by deferring to legislative enactments. As the United States Supreme
Court has said in another context, "our constitution being. one of enumera-
tion, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the (commerce] power, it
becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word," 3 and such power of
definition lies primarily in the judicial branch.0 Indeed, it may be that any
legislature lacks the power to define constitutional terms, and therefore, courts
need not even presume the constitutionality of legislative definitions.P Since the
New York courts have refused to perform the task of definition, it is time for
the United States Supreme Court to deal conclusively with the question of fetal
rights, in a manner grounded in the United States Constitution, and not in
legislative whim.
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Eviction-Landlordl Must Show Sub-
stantial Business Reason for Removal of Leasehold from Market where
Tenant has Successfully Withheld Rent.-In 1968, appellant, Lena Robinson,
moved into a row house in Northwest Washington, D.C., owned by appellee
Diamond Housing Corp. ("Diamond"). Not long thereafter, Mrs. Robinson
began to withhold rent. In a suit by Diamond for possession, Mrs. Robinson
defended on the grounds that substantial housing code violations existed at the
time the lease was signed making it void and unenforceable. The trial court,
after a jury verdict, granted judgment in her favor.' Diamond instituted a sec-
ond suit claiming that since the lease was void Mrs. Robinson was a trespasser
and subject to immediate eviction. This time the trial court granted Mrs. Rob-
inson's motion to dismiss.2 On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that Mrs. Robinson was a tenant at sufferance and not a tres-
passer.3 The court did, however, state that this tenancy could be ended by giving
thirty days notice and removing the property from the rental market. Based
63. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
64. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Barton v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243
(1833). See also 16 CJ.S. Const. Law § 13 (1956), especially n.13.
65. However, there is a presumption in favor of the validity of legislative acts. See, eg,
Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 428 (1926).
1. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The jury
found that code violations did in fact exist at the time the lease was signed, making the
premises unsafe and unsanitary.
2. Id.
3. Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A2d 492, 495 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969). The
court held: "It is well established that an agreement entered into in violation of the law
creates no rights upon the wrongdoer.... We hold that appellee, having entered possession
under a void and unenforceable lease, was not a trespasser but became a tenant at sufferance.'
Id.
4. Id. "Where, as here, it has been determined that the property when rented was not
habitable... and should not have been rented, and if the landlord is unwilling or unable
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on this statement Diamond instituted still another action for possession.6 The
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions rendered summary judgment
for Diamond,6 and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed.7 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
holding that Mrs. Robinson could invoke the defense of retaliatory eviction, and
that the landlord must establish that his desire to evict and to withdraw the unit
from the market is based on a "substantial business reason." Robinson v. Dia-
mond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Traditionally the common law did not apply the usual bilateral contract rules
to leases. Covenants in a lease were treated as independent,1 and a landlord's
breach of even an express covenant to repair was no defense to an action by
him for rent.10 The only duty imposed by law upon the tenant was that of pay-
ing rent once in possession," and the only implied warranty imposed upon the
landlord was that of "quiet enjoyment.' 2 No warranty of repair or of habitabil-
ity was implied.' 3 These landlord-tenant relationships may have made sense
to put the property in a habitable condition, he may and should promptly terminate the
tenancy and withdraw the property from the rental market, because the Regulations forbid
both the rental and the occupancy of such premises." Id. (footnote omitted). The court cited
section 2301 of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia as its authority. Id. at
495 n.14. That section provides: "No owner, licensee, or tenant shall occupy or permit the
occupancy of any habitation in violation of these regulations."
9. 463 F.2d at 859. Diamond gave the required notice and stated that it was unwilling
to make the repairs and that it intended to remove the unit from the market.
6. Id.
7. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 267 A.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970). The
court held that the retaliatory eviction defense of Edwards v. Habib (397 F.2d 687 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969)) should be limited strictly to its facts and
not invoked where a tenant was withholding rent under a successful Brown v. Southall
Realty Co. (237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968)) defense. Id.; see notes 36-41 Infra and
accompanying text.
8. 463 F.2d at 866.
9. 1 American Law of Property § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
10. Id.
11. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of The Past
With Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 225, 227 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Quinn & Phillips]. In addition, since lease covenants were treated as independent (see note
9 supra and accompanying text) a breach by the landlord of the implied warranty of quiet
enjoyment would not allow the tenant to withhold rent unless the landlord had actually
evicted him and destroyed the possession-rent relationship. Id. at 230. It was only after
much evolution of the law that the doctrine of constructive eviction arose. The doctrine
allowed the tenant to abandon the premises and thus sever the possessory relationship, only
when the landlord's breach of his covenant became unbearable. Id. at 235. For a full
discussion of the doctrine of constructive eviction with abandonment see 1 American Law
of Property § 3.51 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
12. Quinn & Phillips 228. The landlord's duty referred only to his own non-interference.
He was under no obligation to protect the tenant from third party interference. Id. at 227
n.2; see Hughes v. Westchester Dev. Corp., 77 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ; United Merchants'
Realty and Improv. Co. v. Roth, 193 N.Y. 570, 86 N.E. 544 (1908). For a full discussion
of the implied warranty of quiet enjoyment see Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1414 (1955).
13. 2 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property ff 233 (1971). "The lessee took the premises
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when they were developed,14 but they are hardly attuned to the needs of the
modem urban dweller who is more-or-less dependent upon the landlord with
respect to the quality of his surroundings 5
In response to the new needs posed by the urban environment, legislatures and
local real estate boards began to impose new obligations on the landlord in the
form of provisions in form leases and local statutes and codes."' However,
the courts continued to treat the rent obligation as independent from the new
duties imposed on the landlord.17 Thus, a breach of these duties would give the
tenant a right to sue for breach of the service agreement 8 but not a right to
withhold rent absent an eviction.19
The most recent attempt to modernize the lease relationship has involved the
use of local building and health codes.20 Initially, these codes relied solely upon
criminal sanctions as a means of forcing landlord compliance. 2' Criminal sanc-
tions, however, have proven largely ineffective in improving the situation, and
the trend is now toward the creation of private remedies for noncompliance.
In 1922 the New York Court of Appeals in Altz v. Leibcrmon,2 4 held that
housing regulations imposed a duty of repair upon the landlord which, if negli-
gently breached, allowed an injured tenant the right to sue for personal injury
in tort,5 despite the fact that the statute made no mention of tort liability, but
rather authorized only criminal sanctions.201 Judge Cardozo stated:
as they were and assumed all risks as to their condition. The lessor had no obligation to put
the premises in repair at the commencement of the term and no obligation to make any
repairs during the term's continuance .... " Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
14. Quinn & Phillips 231.
15. Id. at 232.
16. Id. at 232 n.9.
17. 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152, 154 (1970).
18. Quinn & Phillips 233-34; see Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improv.
Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 39 N.E. 7 (1894).
19. Quinn & Phillips 233-34.
20. Id. at 239. See also Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1254, 1259 (1966).
21. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 20, at 1262. The codes had originally relied on vacate
orders, but the housing shortage caused by World War I rendered this method of enforcement
ineffective. Id.
22. See Quinn & Phillips 239-42 for a full discussion of the problems in attempting to
use criminal sanctions as a means of achieving progress in this area.
23. 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152, 157 (1970).
24. 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
25. Id. at 18-19, 134 N.E. at 704. "The right to seek redress is not limited to the city or its
officers. The right extends to all whom there was a purpose to protect." Id. at 19, 134 N.E.
at 704 (citations omitted). The common law rule of no duty to repair when the landlord had
given up control of the premises had been firmly established in New York. E.g., Golob v.
Pasinsky, 178 N.Y. 458, 70 N.E. 973 (1904). The landlord, however, did have a duty to
repair those areas which the tenants used in common and over which he kept control. Eg.,
Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N.Y. 269, 29 N.E. 104 (1891).
26. New York Tenement House Act, ch. 61, § 124, [19091 N.Y. Cons. Laws (Wadhams)
4453-54.
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At common law there was no duty resting on the landlord of an apartment house to
repair the rooms demised .... The Tenement House Law ... has changed the measure
of his burden .... The meaning is that the premises shall not be suffered to fall into
decay. The duty to prevent this, which, in part at least, once rested upon the tenant,
is now cast upon another.27
Citing the Altz decision the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, in Whetzel v. less Fisher Management Co.,2 8 overturned
the common law rule. There the plaintiff, a tenant in defendant's rooming house,
was injured by a falling ceiling, and brought an action in negligence against the
landlord. The court held that the District of Columbia Housing Regulations
impose a duty of care upon the landlord, a breach of which gives the tenant an
action in tort for personal injury.29
The regulations were given further scope by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in Brown v. Southall Realty Co.80 There the landlord had brought
an eviction action based on nonpayment of rent.81 The court held that since the
landlord knew at the beginning of the lease that the premises were unsafe and
unsanitary, in violation of the code, the lease contract was void and no rent was
due.3 2 Although the code nowhere specifically required a lease so entered into
27. Altz v. Lieberman, 233 N.Y. 16, 17-18, 134 N.E. 703, 703-04 (1922).
28. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
29. Id. at 950. The court relied on D.C. Housing Regs. §§ 2301, 2304, 2501, and 2504
(1955). Section 2301 provides: "No owner, licensee, or tenant shall occupy or permit the
occupancy of any habitation in violation of these regulations." Section 2304 provides: "No
persons shall rent or offer to rent any habitation, or the furnishings thereof, unless such
habitation and its furnishings are in a clean, safe and sanitary condition .... " Section 2501
provides: "Every premises accommodating one or more habitations shall be maintained and
kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations for the occupants." Section 2504
provides specifically for the maintenance of walls and ceilings; see Kanelos v. Kettler,
406 F.2d 951, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1968), which reaffirmed the Whetzel case. Whetzel changed
the old District of Columbia rule found in Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 935 (1953), which had been decided prior to the Regulations.
See National Bank v. Dixon, 301 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1961), which held that the land-
lord's actual knowledge of the defects is not required if he should have known of them by
the use of reasonable care.
30. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
31. In fact Brown had vacated the premises. The court agreed to hear the case on the
basis that its decision, and that of the court below, would serve to make certain facts res
judicata in any future action for rent. Id. at 835. Thus, the question of whether a tenant
can remain in possession without paying rent once a lease is declared void was not before
this court. For a full discussion of this question see notes 53-72 infra and accompanying text.
But cf. Atkins v. United States, 283 A.2d 204 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (landlord's possessory
action held moot where the tenant had vacated and made no claim for a right to possession);
Gaddis v. Dixie Realty Co., 248 A.2d 820 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
32. 237 A.2d at 836-37. The court relied on sections 2304 and 2501 of the Regulations
(see note 29 supra). Testimony at the trial by an inspector for the Department of Licenses
and Inspections established that the landlord had been put on notice of the violations prior
to the lease and that they still existed at the time of the trial. Id. at 836.
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to be held void, the court interpreted sections 2304 and 2501 of the code as
"'imply[ing] a prohibition so as to render the prohibited act void.' "I Southall
Realty, therefore, established the principle that when housing code violations
were in existence prior to the agreement to lease, the contract was void.34 In 1970
this principle was codified by the District's City Council.35
Edwards v. Habib3 6 involved the reporting of a number of code violations by
a month-to-month tenant to the Department of Licenses and Inspections, and a
subsequent attempt by the landlord to evict in retaliation. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit further increased the
protections afforded a tenant under the code by holding that proof of a land-
lord's retaliatory motive would be a good defense to an action for eviction al-
though the District of Columbia eviction statute did not require the landlord
to give any reason at all for the eviction.37 The court reasoned that to allow
retaliatory evictions would so intimidate tenants as to prevent their reporting
code violations, and would thereby frustrate the purposes of the remedial legis-
lation.38 The court inferred the illegality of such intimidation as "inherent in
the legislation even if it is not expressed in the statute itself.' *0 Judge Wright
further held that the question of whether the landlord's subjective intent was
indeed retaliatory was one of fact, "not significantly different from problems with
which the courts must deal in a host of other contexts, such as when they must
decide whether the employer who discharges a worker has committed an unfair
33. Id. at 837. The court thus extended what it called the general rule of illegal contracts
to housing leases. The court relied on Hartman v. Lubar, 133 Fad 44, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"The general rule is that an illegal contract, made in violation of the statutory prohibition
designed for police or regulatory purposes, is void and confers no right upon the wrongdoer."
(footnote omitted).
34. 237 A2d at 837. The question of whether the rule should be extended to violations
arising after the lease was started was one of the problems in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 925 (1970).
35. D.C. Housing Regs. § 2902.1(a) (1970).
36. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 US. 1016 (1969). See also Comment,
Protection for Citizen Complaints to Public Authorities-Prohibition of Retaliatory Evictions:
The case of Edwards v. Habib, 48 Neb. L. Rev. 1101 (1969). For a full discussion of the
retaliatory eviction defense see Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 753 (1971).
37. 397 Fa2d at 699. Judge Wright stated: "It is true that in making his affirmative case
for possession the landlord need only show that his tenant has been given the 30-day statutory
notice .... But while the landlord may evict for any legal reason or for no reason at all,
he is not, we hold, free to evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations
to the authorities." (footnote omitted). Cf. L'Orange v. Medlcal Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57,
63 (6th Cir. 1968) (attempt to cancel malpractice insurance because the insured had testified
in a malpractice suit against a colleague covered by the same company held to be against
public policy and a breach of contract).
38. 397 Fad at 701.
39. Id. at 702 (footnote omitted). Since the Brown holding the Regulations have been
amended to specifically prohibit the type of eviction attempted therein. See D.C. Housing
Regs. § 2910(a) (1970); cf. Nash v. Florida Indus. Conm'n, 389 US. 235 (1967) (Florida
statute which denied unemployment insurance to workers who were discharged in retaliation
for having filed complaints of unfair labor practices struck down).
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labor practice because he has done so on account of the employee's union ac-
tivities." 40
The Edwards court, although it chose a statutory basis for its holding, also
considered, and apparently approved, constitutional arguments brought by Mrs.
Edwards against the validity of retaliatory evictions.41 Other courts have relied
on constitutional grounds.42 In Hosey v. Club Van Cordlandt the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York stated in dictum that a
tenant has a first amendment right to discuss with other tenants the condition of
the building and to encourage them to use legal means to remedy the situation,
and that under the fourteenth amendment the state can take no action to pre-
vent or penalize his exercise of those rights.43 It further stated that a retaliatory
eviction would be a state action and to allow it would be a violation of the four-
teenth amendment. 44
As discussed earlier, the traditional view was that leases gave rise to neither
implied warranties of habitability nor of fitness for use.45 However, in Javins v.
First National Realty Corp.,4 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that the District's housing regulations create such
a warranty in all urban leases, with the standards of the warranty set by the
regulations, and that a breach of the warranty "gives rise to the usual remedies
for breach of contract. " 47 The court, applying usual contract principles, held
the tenant's obligation to pay rent to be "dependent upon the landlord's per-
formance of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain the premises in
habitable condition. '48
This decision thus extended the earlier Southall Realty ruling by requiring
the landlord to substantially comply with the code not only at the beginning of
40. 397 F.2d at 702-03 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The Edwards court thus did not establish any
judicial presumption of an illegal motive. But see notes 59-61 infra and accompanying text.
41. 397 F.2d at 690-98; cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
42. See, e.g., Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But cf.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (though not involving retaliatory evictions this case
strongly indicates that the landlord-tenant relationship should be governed by local law and
not on a constitutional basis). For a discussion of the constitutional question see 23 Ark. L.
Rev. 122 (1969); 3 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 193 (1967).
43. 299 F. Supp. at 504; cf. Thorpe v Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 679 (1967)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (a tenant in a public housing project could not be evicted for the
exercise of her right of association protected by the first and fourteenth amendments).
44. 299 F. Supp. at 505-06; cf. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (involving state
enforcement of trespass laws designed for private discrimination).
45. See note 13 supra.
46. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
47. Id. at 1073. See also Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,
53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). For a full discussion of the law of implied warranties
of habitability in leases see Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971). See also 40 Fordham L. Rev,
123 (1971); 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152 (1970).
48. 428 F.2d at 1082.
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the lease period, but throughout the lease.49 However, unlike Southall Realty,
the Javins decision did not declare the lease contract void for noncompliance.
Instead the tenant was given the right either to set off part of his rent as dam-
ages from the breach in an action for eviction based on nonpayment, 0 or to seek
specific performance of the implied warranty of habitability.5' The warranty
provided by Javins has since been specifically provided for in the housing code. 2
In Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.,53 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit was faced with the question of whether a
landlord who had been unsuccessful in attempting to evict a tenant for nonpay-
ment of rent because of a Southall Realty defense, could, without any considera-
tion of motive, automatically achieve the same result by serving a 30 day notice
to quit. Judge Wright held that the retaliatory defense established in Edwards-4
should be available to those withholding rent under a successful Southall Realty
defense, and that the tenant should be given the opportunity to present her case
to the jury for a determination of the landlord's true subjective motivation.
The court noted the factual differences between the Edwards and Robinson
cases, but felt that they were not sufficiently relevant to take the principal case
out of the general rule established in Edwards."0 Insisting that the instant evic-
tion was retaliatory, and that if allowed would have a chilling effect on future
use of the private mechanisms provided by Brown and Edwards and by the
housing code, 5 7 the court refused to limit Edwards to its facts. In making this
determination, Judge Wright noted, with reference to the right to withhold rent:
This right would be shallow indeed if the landlord were free to penalize its exercise by
eviction. . . .Surely, then, the legislature no more intended to permit retaliatory
evictions as punishment for rent withholding than it intended to permit such evictions
as punishment for reporting housing code violations.0 8
49. Id. at 1081. The court took notice of Southall Realty's reliance upon section 2501.
50. 428 F.2d at 1082-83.
51. Id. at 1082 n.61. See 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 152, 159 n.69 (1970) where it is suggested
that the court did not declare the lease void because of the fear that a tenancy at sufferance
would be created which would allow eviction on 30 days notice. This problem was dealt with
in Robinson. 463 F.2d at 862-63.
52. D.C. Housing Regs. § 2902.2 (1970).
53. 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
55. 463 F.2d at 861. The Robinson court, as had the Edwards court considered briefly
the constitutional basis of preventing retaliatory evictions, but held that "it is unnecessary
for us to reach the constitutional argument, since the legislative intent is now even dearer
than it was when Edwards was decided." Id. at 863. The court then discussed § 2910(c)
of the Regulations which prohibits retaliatory evictions for a tenant's good faith assertion
of rights provided by § 2901 or § 2902 (§ 2902.1 codified the Brown rule). See note 35 supra.
The court concluded that "[i]t is thus dear that the City Council has forbidden evictions in
retaliation for assertion of a Southall Realty defense ... ." 463 F.2d at 864.
56. Id. at 862-63.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 863.
1972] CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The court also attempted to clarify those circumstances which would give rise
to a presumption of retaliatory motive. Initially it noted that the defense is
based upon the jury's determination of the landlord's motive-a determination
which it recognized could in most instances be made only by examining the
landlord's objective manifestations.19 The court then reasoned that "when the
landlord's conduct is 'inherently destructive' of tenants' rights, or unavoidably
chills their exercise, the jury may ... presume that the landlord intended this
result."6' 0 Further, it held that an unexplained eviction after the successful as-
sertion of a Southall Realty (or Javins) defense is inherently destructive and so
gives rise to the presumption of the illegal purpose.01
The court next addressed the question of what the landlord must prove to
rebut the presumption of illegal purpose. This was answered in terms of "sub-
stantial business reason." That is, the landlord must show that he was "motivated
by some legitimate business purpose rather than by the illicit motive which
would otherwise be presumed." 62 As an example of what would be considered a
valid business reason the court posited the situation of a landlord forced to re-
move a unit from the market because his financial condition precluded the
making of repairs required by the code. 3 Another example, according to the
court, would be where a landlord chose to go out of business entirely. This
example, however, was carefully circumscribed by adding that the landlord's
absolute "right to discontinue rental of all his units in no way justifies a partial
closing designed to intimidate the remaining tenants."'6
The court further defined the "substantial business reason" test by applying
it to the instant facts. It observed that, even if Diamond had asserted a valid
business purpose, summary judgment would not have been warranted. In the
first place, the final determination of whether the asserted reason actually exists
is a question of fact for the jury. 5 In the second place, even if the jury finds
that a valid reason does in fact exist, it may still decide that the landlord's true
motivation was retaliatory, and judgment may be for the tenant.00
S9. Id. at 865; see Ackerhalt v. Smith, 141 A.2d 187, 189 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958).
60. 463 F.2d at 865; cf. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,
45 (1954).
61. 463 F.2d at 866. But see note 40 supra. The Edwards court did not make a presump-
tion of an illegal motive.
62. 463 F.2d at 865. The court emphasized "that the landlord's desire to remove a tenant
who is not paying rent is not such a legitimate purpose." Id.; cf. NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967).
63. 463 F.2d at 866. The court emphasized that inability to repair is not the only
legitimate business reason for taking a unit off the market and the legitimacy of other reasons
should be decided case by case. Id. at n.61.
64. 463 F.2d at 867 (footnote omitted). The court relied on the Supreme Court's holding
in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1965).
65. 463 F.2d at 865.
66. Id. Where the jury finds several possible motives it has the duty of weighing them
and determining which was the true cause. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965).
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Another problem facing the court was whether allowing Mrs. Robinson to re-
main indefinitely in the unit without paying rent would be inconsistent with the
public policy against long-term occupancy of substandard housing.67 The court
concluded that its decision would not have such a result.6s In the opinion of
the court, substandard housing can be divided into two categories. There are
those situations in which the landlord has a legitimate business reason for re-
moving the unit from the market. In this category public policy will be served
by allowing the landlord to evict his tenants. There is another category in which
the landlord is able to repair the premises, but is unwilling to do so. In this
situation he has constructively evicted the tenant by making the premises un-
tenantable. He has thus breached the implied warranty of habitability provided
by Javins and by the code, so that the tenant may bring an action for specific
performance. 69
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Robb opposed the majority presumption of
illicit purpose and its imposition of the burden of proving a substantial business
reason for removing the unit from the market.70 He believed that the decision
would, in effect, put the landlord's business at the discretion of the jury.71 The
ultimate effect, he felt, would be to discourage investment in rental housing,
rather than, as the majority suggested, to promote such housing.72
The holding of the court concerning the retaliatory eviction defense certainly
appears to be a logical extension of past decisions and the housing code. The
trend toward private remedies for substandard housing is strong and the District
of Columbia Circuit seems to be determined to remain at the forefront. There is,
however, one potential danger-landlord abandonment. It may well prove to be
the case that the cost of strict compliance with the provisions of the housing
code will simply drive low-cost housing from the market. This is certainly one
of the factors which will have to be monitored in evaluating the long term effect
of this decision.
There is another problem which must be considered. Judge Robb's fears-
that the court has placed such an oppressive burden of proof upon the landlord
that it will be virtually impossible for him to prove proper motive, and that the
67. 463 F.2d at 867-68.
68. Id. at 868; see D.C. Housing Regs. § 2301 (1955). Judge Wright also makes the
assumption that despite the strict enforcement of the regulations "most landlords will find
ownership of property sufficiently profitable . .. to remain in business." 463 F.2d at 860.
But see National Comm'n on Urban Problems, Report to the Congress and to the President
of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The Commission
in discussing housing codes stated "that strict enforcement on a mass basis would lead to
mass abandonment of properties by their owners and/or higher rents with resultant occupant
displacement." Id. at 286 (footnote omitted).
69. 463 F.2d at 869; see 428 F.2d at 1082 n.61. The court seemed to ignore the situation
in which the landlord cannot make the repairs, but in which the jury finds his true motive
was retaliatory. In such a case the landlord cannot evict the tenant, but an action by the
tenant for specific performance would be ineffective.
70. 463 F.2d at 871.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 872.
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landlord is in fact subject to virtually unlimited jury discretion-may be well
founded. Only future cases will show how wisely juries use this power. This, and
a clarification of what courts will accept as legitimate and substantial business
reasons may well determine whether this case will, in the long run, improve hous-
ing conditions or, instead, discourage future investment.
Patent Law-Sale of Partially Assembled Components of a Patented Device
For Final Assembly in a Foreign Country Does Not Infringe Domestic
Combination Patent.-Plaintiff obtained an injunction in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against infringement by
defendant of plaintiff's patented shrimp deveiner.1 Plaintiff's patent was for
the combination of the components that made up the device-none of the
individual parts were themselves patentable.2 Defendant requested a modifica-
tion of the injunction to establish that he was not prohibited from manufactur-
ing in the United States and exporting to Brazil, the unassembled parts that
would comprise plaintiff's machine.3 The district court 4 held that modification
of the injunction was unnecessary since the law clearly established that an
injunction against manufacturing and selling did not include a prohibition on
exporting the unassembled parts.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, reversed.6 It rejected the district court's analysis of what consti-
1. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. La. 1969).
2. The court determined that plaintiff held two valid patents. The first, granted in 1954,
was for a device which utilized water pressure, natural forces of gravity and sharpened
blades, to slit open the curved backs of shrimp thus exposing their unpalatable intestines-
commonly called veins. This patent expired shortly before argument before the Supreme
Court.
The second, granted in 1957, was for a "tumbler," a device consisting of a cylindrical
steel drum whose sides have been perforated resulting in numerous hooked "lips" which fully
remove the exposed shrimp veins to complete the deveining process.
There was nothing original about any of the parts making up the machine. In fact the
essence of the tumbler, perforated sheet metal, is a standard punch lip material ordered by
plaintiff from an illustrated commercial catalog. Id.
3. All of the parts were produced in the United States but not all of the parts were
assembled in the United States to complete the apparatus. Defendant shipped the several
sections of the device in separate crates but admitted that the entire machine could then
be fully assembled in less than an hour. In writing to his foreign customer, defendant said:
"'We are handicapped by a decision against us in the United States. This was a very technical
decision and we can manufacture the entire machine without any complication In the United
States, with the exception that there are two parts that must not be assembled in the United
States, but assembled after the machine arrives in Brazil. This assembly will take less than
one hour.'" 443 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1971).
4. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 310 F. Supp. 926 (ED. La. 1970).
5. "Every court of appeal that has considered an actual situation in any way resembling
the one here proposed has held that the sale of a product for export in unassembled form Is
not an infringement of the domestic patent." Id. at 927.
6. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971).
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tutes patent infringement according to section 271 of title 35, United States
Code 7 and held that by "substantially manufacturing" the machine in the
United States, defendant had infringed plaintiff's patent.8 The United States
Supreme Court, citing this country's "historical antipathy to monopoly," which
would require literal interpretation of patent statutes and strict construction
of patent rights, held that defendant's actions did not constitute infringement
and it reversed.9 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitrarn Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
"Under the common law the inventor had no right to exclude others from
making and using his invention."'' 0 This situation was the outgrowth of the
common law aversion to monopoly" and the common law right possessed by
every member of the community to carry on any trade or business in any man-
ner or way that he so desired.'- During the sixteenth century English monarchs
began granting exclusive privileges to manufacturers and craftsmen in an effort
to induce skilled aliens to come to England and help stimulate the British
industrial base which at this period lagged far behind the continental countries
in development.' 3
Since these "privileges" created monopolies,' 4 a continuing struggle evolved
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Infringement of patent. (a) Except
as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. (c) Who-
ever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition,
or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part
of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer."
8. The court took issue with the reasoning of the district court that a machine is not
"made" in the United States until it is in fully assembled form. The court said: "The word
'makes' should not be given an artificial, technical construction but should be accorded a
construction in keeping with the ordinary meaning of that term.... We hold that 'makes'
means what it ordinarily connotes--the substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of
the machine." 443 F.2d at 938-39. "To hold otherwise would subvert the Constitutional
scheme of promoting 'the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Disomeries.'
U.S. Const. art. I § 8 cl. 8." Id. at 939.
9. The Supreme Court, interpreting the Constitutional provision for patents as a mandate
to Congress to set up whatever procedures it deemed necessary, felt itself limited to the con-
struction of the 1952 statute, giving great weight to what the Court saw as legislative intent.
For a skeptical approach as to the true intent of the legislature, see Rich, Congressional Intent
-- Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, Pat. Procurement & Exploitation 61 (1963).
10. 406 US. at 525-26.
11. "'At common law no man could be prohibited from working in any lawful trade,
for the law abhors idleness . .. and therefore the common law abhors all monopolies which
prohibit any from working in any lawful trade . . . .' H. Fox, Monopolies and Patents
90, n.15 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 24-56.
14. Id.
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between the monarchs, who wished to develop the realm by granting monopolies,
and Parliament, which was striving to preserve the free trade guarantees of
Magna Carta' 5 and the statutes which followed.' 0
In 1624 Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies which declared all
monopolies contrary to the laws of England, T but provided an exception: the
granting of limited patent rights to meritorious inventors.' 8 This exception was
the underlying rationale of the American constitutional 0 provision for patents.20
The conflict between the proponents of stimulating inventiveness through limited
patent rights, and the opponents of all monopolies, continues to pervade judicial
opinions concerning patent infringements and patent rights.21
15. "The declaration of Magna Carta that all merchant strangers in the realm should
be able to buy and sell their goods by the old and rightful customs, is itself an Illustration
of the early attempts at limitation of the prerogative right of granting monopolies ..
Id. at 58-59.
16. For a discussion of the statutes involved see id. at 59.
17. Id. at 113-15.
18. "'That any declaration beforementioned shall not extend to any letters-patent or
grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years, or under, hereafter to be made of the sole
working or making of any manner of new manufacture within this realm, to the true and
first inventor of such manufactures, which others, at the time of making such letters-patent
and grant, shall not use .... 1 " F. Vaughan, Economics of Our Patent System 18 (1925)
[hereinafter cited as Vaughan].
In the years preceding the Statute of Monopolies the courts had already distinguished the
granting of patents to reward inventiveness from the royal grants of industrial monopolies.
Thus, Lord Coke said: "'Now, therefore, I will show you how the judges have heretofore al-
lowed of monopoly-patents,--which is that when any man by his own charge and industry,
or by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine
tending to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before; and that for the good of
the realm ;-that in such cases the king may grant to him a monopoly-patent .... "' Id. at
17-18.
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. Fox 191-94; Vaughan 18-20. For a discussion of the development of the patent system
see Huhne, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 16
L.Q. Rev. 44 (1900); Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present,
13 L.Q. Rev. 313 (1897); Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative
and at Common Law, 12 L.Q. Rev. 141 (1896). For a discussion of the historical develop-
ment of the American Patent system see Federico, State Patents, 13 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 166
(1931); Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 Am. J.
Legal Hist. 309 (1961).
21. This conflict may also be seen in the related Issue of defining the status of the patent
right under the federal patent statutes and the interpretation of the intent of the Constitu-
tional mandate in article III. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518
(1972); A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950). Thus, Fox, for
example, viewed the Constitutional mandate as being a new concept in patent rights. "[T]he
right to obtain a patent is here expressed as being no longer a matter of grace or expediency
but a right to which, upon fulfillment of the prescribed conditions, any person is entitled."
Fox 193. While Justice Douglas on the other hand, the outspoken foe of monopolies, viewed
it as a limited privilege and as a mandate to apply a strict Constitutional standard. In his
concurring opinion in the A. & P. case, he said: "Every patent is the grant of a privilege of
CASE NOTES
Ever since Brown v. Duchesne, 22 the Supreme Court has dearly stated that
there is no common law property right in one's inventions, and any right to the
exclusive use of one's creation must be derived from the Constitution and
statutory provisions for patent rights.P The Court in Brown also affirmed the
principle that the patent rights were limited to the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. 24 In Bullock Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric and Manufacturing Co.,25 this doctrine was clarified by the court when
it held:
The monopoly of a patent extends to the making or selling, as well as the using, of
the patented device within the United States....
While it is true that the monopoly of the plaintiff's patents did not extend beyond
the limits of the United States, yet it would be no defense to say that the patented
article had been made in the United States only for the purpose of being sold and used
in a country to which the protection of the laws of the United States did not extend.
The patentee is entitled to monopolize the making of his device in the United States
as well as a monopoly of there selling or using it.20
The court found on the facts in this case that there had been no infringement
of the combination patent when defendant manufactured a part of the combina-
tion in the United States and exported it to be integrated into the complete
apparatus in Canada, where the completed machine was sold. The court held
that since the combination would only be duplicated in Canada, where the
United States patent laws had no effect, the intent of defendant to aid in the
construction of the machine was no more of an infringement than if defendant
had sent the part to someone licensed by the patentee to manufacture the
machine.27
Early in the development of patent law the Supreme Court limited the scope
of combination patents.2 8 In Prouty v. Draper'29 plaintiffs claimed damages for
exacting tolls from the public." 340 U.S. at 154. See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). For a discussion of the various opinions see 20 Am.
U.L. Rev. 175 (1970).
22. 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
23. "But the right of property which a patentee has in his invention, and his right to its
exclusive use, is derived altogether from these statutory provisions . . . and that his rights
are to be regulated and measured by these laws, and cannot go beyond them." Id. at 195.
24. Id. at 195-96. The Court said: "ETlhe use of [the patent] outside of the jurisdiction of
the United States is not an infringement of his rights ... ." Id. This jurisdictional limitation
has been codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970) which states in pertinent part: "Every patent shall
contain a short title of the invention ... of the right to exclude others from making ...
throughout the United States ... ."
25. 129 F. 105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 636 (1904).
26. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
2?. Id. at 111-12.
28. E.g., Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481, 492 (1891); Prouty v.
Draper, 41 US. 335 (1842). For an analysis of the criteria necessary to constitute a combina-
tion and a discussion of the various elements therein see J. Hayes, The Nature of Patentable
Invention 90-102 (1948).
29. 41 U.S. 335 (1842).
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the infringement of their patented plough by defendant who had constructed
a plough using at least two of the three major components of plaintiffs' machine.
The Court held that since plaintiffs' patent was for the combination of all the
elements, the use of two out of three of these elements would not constitute
infringement. 0 The Court went on to state:
The patent is for a combination .... None of the parts referred to are new, and none
are claimed as new .... The use of any two of these parts only, or of two combined
with a third, which is substantially different, in form, ... is, therefore, not the thing
patented. It is not the same combination, if it substantially differs from it in any of
its parts.8'
In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.,8 2 the patentee of a
combination patent attempted to control the sale of one of the unpatentable
components. The Court overruled the holding of Leeds and Catlin Co. v. Victor
Talking Machine Co.,83 which offered "authority for the conclusion that he who
sells an unpatented part of a combination patent for use in the assembled machine
may be guilty of contributory infringement."3 4 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, said: "The result of this decision, together with those which have
preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement." a5
In effect, the Mercoid court ruled that "if there is no [direct] infringement of
a patent there can be no contributory infringer."3 "
When Congress enacted the Patent Act of 195237 the status of the Mercoid
case was put into question. However, in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co.,38 the Court held that the 1952 statute left the Mercoid
decision intact.3 9 The Court read section 2 71 (c) 4 defining contributory infringe-
ment, as being applicable only in cases where there would also be a direct
infringement.41
30. Id. at 340-41.
31. Id. at 341.
32. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
33. 213 U.S. 301 (1909).
34. 320 U.S. at 668.
35. Id. at 669.
36. Id. at 677.
37. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 729 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293
(1970)).
38. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
39. Id. at 341, 365 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of the Aro-Mercold
decisions, the demise of the contributory infringement doctrine, and the effect of the 1952
Statute, see Glaser, The Expansion of Protection for Patentee-Proceeding Against the In-
ducing or Contributory Infringer, 9 Pat. L. Ann. 63 (1971); Hildreth, Contributory In-
fringement, 44 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 512 (1962); Comment, Infringement Under Section 271(b)
of 1952 Patent Act, 7 St. Louis U.L.J. 98 (1962); 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 94 (1961);
41 B.U.L. Rev. 547 (1961); 49 Calif. L. Rev. 988 (1961); 37 Notre Dame Law. 263 (1961);
1961 U. Ill. L. Forum 343; 7 Vill. L. Rev. 149 (1961).
40. See note 7 supra.
41. The Court said: "It is plain that § 271(c)-a part of the Patent Code enacted In
1952-made no change in the fundamental precept that there can be no contributory Infringe-
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Since there can be no contributory infringement unless there is a direct
infringement,4 and there can be no infringement outside the territorial juris-
diction of the United States,4 3 in determining whether there is an infringement
of a combination patent by one who manufactures and partially assembles the
components in the United States for export sale, the primary question is whether
there has been a direct infringement in the United States.44 This precise question
was answered by the court in Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea.0 3
In Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, plaintiff held valid combination patents 4'
on certain electrical circuits, used in radio receiving sets, involving methods
"of generating or producing alternating currents by 'causing current to flow' in one
of two coupled circuits . . .,,17 to provide power to operate a radio receiver.
Defendant manufactured radio receivers exclusive of the vacuum tubes, which
defendant bought on the open market. "To operate the receiver, it [was] neces-
sary to insert the vacuum tubes into the sockets provided for them .... '"8
The court determined that plaintiff's combination was not achieved until
there was an actual physical connection between the terminals of the circuits
of the receiver manufactured by defendant, and the electrodes of the vacuum
tubes; "that is, until the tubes [were] inserted in the sockets of the receiver,""'
and potentially able to make use of the current provided through plaintiff's
patented methods of electrical conduction. 0 Defendant packaged the tubes and
the receiver in one carton, but the tubes were separately wrapped and were
not attached to the electrodes. The radio was fully assembled, by inserting the
tubes, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
The court held that there was no direct infringement of plaintiff's patent
since the radio receiver was never in fully assembled form in the United States.P1
ment in the absence of a direct infringement. That section defines contributory infringement
in terms of direct infringement-namely the sale of a component of a patented combination
or machine for use 'in an infringement of such patent.2 " 365 U.S. at 341-42.
42. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972).
43. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915); Bullock
Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 F. 105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 194
U.S. 636 (1904); see note 25 supra.
44. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972).
45. 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935).
46. The two claims said to have been infringed were as follows: "'25. Means for pro-
ducing sustained electrical oscillations comprising an oscillatory circuit having two electrodes
in an exhausted receptacle and a second circuit coupled thereto having a conducting body
interposed between said electrodes.'" Id. at 628. "'19. In an electrical system, an evacuated
vessel, hot and cold grid and plate electrodes therefor, a circuit connecting each of said cold
electrodes with said hot electrode, said circuits being associated to react upon one another.'
Id.
47. Id. at 627.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 628.
50. Id. at 627-29.
51. Id. at 628. The court also held that export sale of all of the unassembled parts of a
combination patent was also not contributory infringement. Id. This aspect of the unassembled
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It said:
No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed. His monopoly does
not cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements capable of being, but never
actually, associated to form the invention. Only when such association is made is
there a direct infringement of his monopoly, and not even then if it is done outside the
territory for which the monopoly was granted.52
Upon rehearing in 193753 defendant admitted having initially connected the
circuits and the vacuum tubes in order to test the receivers, and having then
disassembled the radio, separately wrapped the tubes and the receivers and
exported them. The court said:
In the instant case the invention is defined as a combination of vacuum tubes with
circuits. Defendants may not be relieved of infringement merely because the tube
electrodes are physically disconnected from the circuits at the moment of sale.54
An argument has been made 5 that in modifying the earlier injunction the
court did not solely rely on the technicality of the single instance of complete
assemblage, rather that the court was reversing its previous decision and finding
infringement because of the status of the parts themselves at the time of sale.50
This interpretation of the 1937 decision was supported by the words of Judge
Swan, the author of the 1935 decision, in his dissent to the 1937 decision. He said:
In holding that the sale in this country of the disassembled parts of the invention for
assembly and use abroad is a direct infringement, I think we overrule our prior de-
cision in Radio cCorporation v. Andrea.57
The cases following the two Andrea decisions, however, distinguished the two
holdings on the grounds that there had been an instance of complete assemblage,
and considered the 1935 Andrea decision as the law, untouched by the 1937
holding or Judge Swan's remarks.5 s
In Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering and Foundry Co.,50 the
court stated:
components export sales cases need no longer be delved into in light of the Mercod-Aro
decisions.
52. Id.
53. Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937).
54. Id. at 614.
55. This was the argument of the court of appeals in Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing
Co., 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 518 (1972), and of the dissent In the
Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532-33 (1972)
(dissenting opinion).
56. The court said: "The purchaser to connect the tube needs only insert it In the socket.
No adjustment is required; no screw or nut need be tightened. Where the elements of an
invention are thus sold in substantially unified and combined form, infringement may not be
avoided by a separation or division of parts which leaves to the purchaser a simple task of
integration." 90 F.2d at 613.
57. Id. at 615 (dissenting opinion).
58. For a full discussion of this concept see text accompanying notes 59-64 Infra.
59. 235 F.2d 224 (3rd Cir. 1956).
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We are in full accord with the rule thus laid down in the Andrea case .... Its force,
in our view, is not impaired by the later opinion of the court after final hearing in the
same case .... 60
In Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Link-Belt Co.,G1 the court relied on the clear
precedents provided by the Cold Metal and 1935 Andrea decisions,02 in holding:
[T]he manufacture and sale in this country of parts of an apparatus to be assembled
outside the territorial limits of the United States does not infringe a combination
patent limited to the embodiment of those parts as elements in combination.es
The Hewitt court quoted the analysis by the Cold Metal court of the effect of
the 1937 Andrea holding on the 1935 decision and agreed that the two holdings
were distinguishable on the basis of the evidence in the 1937 rehearing that
there had been a fully assembled radio for testing purposes.04
When the 1952 patent statute was under consideration in Congress, 5 a sponsor
of the bill said, in a Congressional debate prior to passage, that it merely codified
existing case law.66 The assumption was made that the case law codified in the
1952 statute was the 1935 Andrea decision.or Since any patent rights plaintiff
may have are "derived from its patent grant, and thus from the patent statute,"e"
the state of the law on these types of combination patent infringements depends
somewhat on what law was codified in 1952, and the concomitant question of
whether the 1935 Andrea decision is the correct case law to be followed.
The district court in Laitran Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co.,6 held that
the 1937 Andrea decision did not overrule the 1935 holding70 and also that the
1935 decision was the law to be followed2
The law would have remained clear on this point: that there is no infringement
unless there is final assembly in the United States, had not the court of appeals
in Laitram unearthed the 1937 Andrea decision and set the scene for questioning
60. Id. at 230.
61. 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966).
62. Id. at 229-30.
63. Id. at 229.
64. Id. at 230.
65. 98 Cong. Rec. 9323 (1952).
66. Id. (remarks of Senator McCarran); see Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
406 U.S. 518, 519-30 (1972).
67. 406 U.S. at 530 n.10.
68. Id. at 526.
69. 310 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. La. 1970).
70. Id. at 928. The court said: "The decree was then modified although Judge Swan
dissented on the basis of the original opinion. Plaintiffs argue that Judge Swan was correct
in saying that the prior opinion was in effect overruled; a majority of that court did not
think so." Id.
71. "'WTe read Andrea as standing for the proposition that a combination claim of a
United States patent is not infringed absent presence of the combination in assembled form
within the United States."' Id. at 928 (italics omitted) (quoting Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v.
Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1966)).
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whether it had in fact left the 1935 Andrea decision "unimpaired."7 2 The
court also questioned whether the statements in Congress concerning the 1952
statute could still be construed as legislative intent to codify that 1935 deci-
sion.73 The court of appeals said that the issue was one of first impression
in that circuit and that the only other decisions applicable were Andrea, Cold
Metal and Hewitt. The latter two cases, the court pointed out, were based on
Andrea.74 The court summed up the Andrea 1935 reasoning:
Since the machine was not completed within the United States, there can literally
be no infringement. "No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed." 70
The court then went on to reject this reasoning as being antagonistic to the
constitutional mandate providing for patent grants, and as an erroneous construc-
tion of the relevant statute, section 271 (a).70 It said:
Such a dependence on technicality would require us to countenance obvious schemes,
perhaps as simple as omitting an important screw, designed to evade the mandate of
§ 2 71(a). . . . We hold that "makes" means what it ordinarily connotes-the sub-
stantial manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine. 77
The court did not set minimum guidelines for what would constitute infringe-
ment but said:
[W]hen all the parts of a patented machine are produced in the United States and,
in merely minor respects, the machine is to be finally assembled for its intended use
in a foreign country, that the machine is "made" within the United States.78
Thus, the court of appeals in reversing the district court's decision urged a test
of substantiality over a test of technicality in considering what the word "makes"
in section 271 (a) means.79
The issue facing the Supreme Court 0 was what practical consideration was
to be given to section 271(a). The Court said:
Thus, in order to secure the injunction it seeks, Laitram must show a § 271(a)
direct infringement by Deepsouth in the United States, that is, that Deepsouth
"makes," "uses," or "sells" the patented product within the bounds of this country....
72. The court had hinted at this earlier in Kirby v. United States, 297 F.2d 466 (5th Cir.
1961). The court said: "We do not pass on the taxpayer's legal contention that in the case
of a combination patent there is no infringement until all elements are finally brought to-
gether in workable shape, and if that is all done in a foreign country after they are all
manufactured and shipped from the United States there is no violation of a United States
patent. The principal cases relied upon by him in support of this thesis are [Andrea and
Cold Metal]. But see the second appearance of ... Andrea." 297 F.2d at 470 n.2 (citations
omitted).
73. 406 U.S. at 530-31.
74. 443 F.2d at 938.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 939; see note 7 supra.
77. 443 F.2d at 939.
78. Id.
79. See note 33 supra.
80. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
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The sales question thus resolves itself into the question of manufacture: did Deepsouth
"make" (and then sell) something cognizable under the patent law as the patented in-
vention, or did it "make" (and then sell) something that fell short of infringement?81
The Court held that absent new Congressional action, the law as stated in
Andrea 1935 was to be followed,es and that the 1952 statute did indeed codify
that very decision.P The Court dismissed the lower court's argument that the
1935 decision did not conform to the intent of article I, section 8, clause 8 of
the Constitution:
[T]he Constitution is permissive, and the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go
can come only from Congress. We are here construing the provisions of a statute
passed in 1952.84
The Laitram Court left the 1935 Andrea decision fully intact, and by rejecting
the criticisms of the 1935 holding levied by the court of appeals, firmly estab-
lished that 1935 Andrea was the law and that this decision was codified by the
1952 statute.85
The scope of the Court's decision in Laitram was limited. This becomes clear
by examining the traditional tests applied by the courts in dealing with infringe-
ment challenges to devices which are not exact reproductions of patented devices.
The first is the court-made doctrine of equivalents, applied in cases where the
challenged device performs substantially in the same way to achieve the same
result as the patented one, but has minor alterations.8 0 The leeway granted the
patentee concerning what constitutes "substantially the same performance"
depends on the degree of invention and other relevant factors.87 While this
doctrine applies to combination patents it is usually narrowly construed, giving
the patentee a small range wherein to prove equivalent operation.6s The second
81. Id. at 527.
82. Id. at 529.
83. Id. at 530.
84. Id.
85. At the foundation of the Court's opinion was the anti-monopoly viewpoints shared
by the majority; see note 22 supra. In Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Mtainte-
nance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945), the Court said: "[A] patent is an exception to
the general rule against monopolies .... The . . .consequences of a patent . . . give the
public a paramount interest in seeing that ... such monopolies are kept within their legiti-
mate scope." In reference to this point the Court said in Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ.
of Il. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971), "One obvious manifestation of this principle
has been the series of decisions in which the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the
physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly." This attitude of the Court prompted
Mr. Justice Jackson to say: "But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office passion
for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this Court for striking them down so
that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands
on." Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
86. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
87. Id. at 608-09.
88. Texstream Corp. v. Blanchard, 352 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
936 (1967); Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263 (1889); Clough v. Barker,
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test concerns challenged devices that omit an element of a combination and do
not replace it with its equivalent. Since all elements of a combination patent as
issued are considered essential, 89 any omission of a claimed element in the
combination will preclude infringement. 90 The Laitram decision established a
third test, to be applied in hybrid cases-where the partially assembled device
is substantially the same as the completed device, but where final assembly is
lacking. The substantiality test used in the doctrine of equivalents dealing with
challenged devices that are whole was urged by the court of appeals for applica.
tion in the unassembled component cases as well. 91 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, preferred the technicality test, and thus significantly limited the area in
which a combination patentee can claim infringement.92
Given the coexistence and continued vitality of the substantiality and tech-
nicality tests the Laitran; decision has no effect in the area of pioneer patent
cases where the test of substantiality is used. Even within the realm of un.
assembled combination patents, the decision is limited to the export sale and
foreign assembly situation. This is so because manufacture and sale in the United
States of unassembled components of a combination patent to be assembled
within the United States has been held to be not only contributory infringement
but direct infringement as well.9 Although limited in scope, the decision firmly
and clearly establishes that short of final assembly, any degree of assemblage
of the components of a combination patent for export sale and final "operative"
assembly, is not infringement of the patent. The 1935 Andrea decision, where
final assembly could have been accomplished by the simple insertion of the
vacuum tubes, is an even better example of the extent to which this rule will be
applied, than the Laitram case where an hour's time was required for final
assembly.
While the Laitram holding practically nullifies any advantage the combination
patentee may have had regarding foreign markets, he still has recourse to foreign
106 U.S. 166 (1882); Wicke v. Ostrum, 103 U.S. 461 (1880); Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S.
647 (1879); Ives v. Hamilton, 92 U.S. 426 (1875); FMC Corp. v. F.E. Myers & Bro., 384
F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968); Pratt & Whitney Co. v. United
States, 345 F.2d 838 (Ct. C. 1965).
89. Keating v. Stearnes Imperial Co., 347 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1965); McCullough Tool Co.
v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966);
Reed v. Parrack, 276 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1960).
90. Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399 (1905); Roller Mill
Patent, 156 U.S. 261 (1895); Weatherhead v. Coupe, 147 U.S. 322 (1893) ; Phoenix Caster Co.
v. Spiegel, 133 U.S. 360 (1890); Forncrook v. Root, 127 U.S. 176 (1888); Yale Lock Mfg.
Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 373 (1886); Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Ass'n, 400
F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969); FMC Corp. v. F.E. Myers &
Bro., 384 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968); Keating v. Stearnes
Imperial Co., 347 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1965); Power Curbers Inc. v. ED). Etnyro & Co., 298
F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1962).
91. 443 F.2d at 939.
92. 406 U.S. at 531.
93. Metal Arts Co. v. Fuller Co., 389 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1968).
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patent law to protect his invention.94 The Court disapproved of plaintiff's not
trying to avail himself of this opportunity and felt that plaintiff should have
relied on his foreign patent instead of attempting to have the United States
courts expand the jurisdiction of the patent laws. 5
In those instances where the patentee is unable to resort to foreign patents
for pr6tection he is left with almost no chance of enjoining infringement of his
patent unless he can show total duplication and assembly within the United
States. In light of the Court's ruling, this will be very hard for the combination
patentee to establish 96
Securities-Beneficial Owner of More Than 10% of a Corporation's Stock
Allowed to Minimize Section 16(b) Liability by Disposing of His Holdings
in Two Transactions.-On June 16, 1967, Emerson Electric Company, in a
take-over attempt, acquired 13.2% of the outstanding Dodge Manufacturing
Company common stock. The take-over attempt was stymied by Dodge share-
holder approval of a defensive merger with Reliance Electric Company. Failing
to gain control, Emerson thereafter sought to divest itself of its Dodge hold-
ings.' Following the advice of its general counsel, Emerson, in an attempt to
reduce liability for "short-swing" profits under section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,2 reduced its holdings to 9.96% in one transaction and
94. 406 U.S. at 531.
95. Id.
96. The dissent is significant and may prove to be the harbinger of a new Court approach
to patent rights. The four Nixon appointees dissented, echoing for the most part the criti-
cisms of the 1935 Andrea decision made originally by the court of appeals. Id. at 533-34
(dissenting opinion). They urged a test of substantiality, arguing that to do otherwise would
violate the intent of the Constitution. Id. at 534 (dissenting opinion). They were also
troubled by the position of the patentee as a result of the technical interpretation of § 271(a).
While the Court in the past limited the scope of patents and often found no infringement, and
the majority opinion is a continuation of the anti-monopoly limited patent rights approach
of the Court, the dissent, advocates of stronger patent rights, may yet carry the day.
1. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 420 (1972).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). This section
provides: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an e'vpted security) within
any period of less than six months ...shall inure to and be recoverable by the isuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months .... This subsection shall not be con-
strued to cover any transaction wheqe such beneficial owner was not such both at the time
of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any tramns-
action or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."
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thereafter sold its remaining shares in a second transaction.3 Since the two
transactions had occurred within six months of the original purchase, Reliance
demanded the profits realized in both transactions. To clarify its section
16(b) liability, Emerson sought a declaratory judgment in Federal court. 4
The court held that the sales, although technically discrete were part of "a
single pre-determined plan . . with the overall intent and purpose of avoiding
Section 16(b) liability."'3 The court of appeals reversed, holding that since
Emerson was no longer the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the out-
standing Dodge stock at the time of the second sale, there could be no liability
for short-swing profits.6 The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision, rea-
soned that the intent to escape section 16(b) liability did not affect the express
statutory requirement that a person own more than 10% of the stock at the
time of both purchase and sale.7 Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric
Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
Congressional investigationss leading to the enactment of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19349 exposed widespread abuse by corporate officers, directors
and large shareholders of inside information used in transactions involving
the securities of their corporations. Designed to prevent this unfair use of in-
side information, section 16(b) allowed the issuer to recover the profits made
by any beneficial owner of more than 10% of the outstanding stock, or by
its directors or officers "from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
The term "beneficial owner" in section 16(b) refers to "[elvery person who [owns]
more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted
security) which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title." Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970). Although the terms "short-swing" and "Insider"
are consistently used in cases and commentaries, they lack explicit statutory definition.
Under section 16(b), "short-swing" is generally understood to mean any transaction con-
sisting of a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of an equity security within six months;
an "insider" is understood to mean a director, officer or more-than-107o shareholder of the
corporation whose stocks are being traded. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970);
Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities Under
Section 16(b), 45 Va. L. Rev. 949, 963 (1959); Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to
Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(b) "Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1034
n.4 (1969).
3. 404 U.S. at 420.
4. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo. 1969), modified,
434 F.2d 918 (8th. Cir 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
5. 306 F. Supp. at 592.
6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), the district court certified the case for
interlocutory appeal and the court of appeals granted leave to appeal, Emerson Elec.
Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
7. 404 U.S. 418 (1972). Mr. justice Powell and Mr. justice Rhnquist took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
8. S. Rep. Nos. 792 & 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep. Nos. 1383 &
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before tie Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d & 73d Cong. (1932-34).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970)).
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of any equity security . . . within any period of less than six months."10
Underlying the section was the theory that if all possibility of profit were re-
moved, insiders would discontinue such trading."
Although section 16(b) seems uncommonly straightforward, 2 numerous cases
have been necessary to determine the meaning of such terms as "purchase, " 1l
"sale,"' 4 "10% shareholder" 15 and "director."' 0 In the usual purchase and sale
transaction the objective criteria of section 16(b) have been stressed.' 7 In
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,'8 the first case to construe section 16(b), the
defendant contended that since he had not actually made use of inside in-
formation, he was outside the scope of the section. 10 The court, however,
adopting the objective test intended by the drafters of the Act,20 stated that
to require a "showing of an actual unfair use of inside information, would
render senseless the provisions of the legislation . ... ,21 Therefore, the Smolowe
court reasoned that the legislative test must be applied without regard to
actual intent2 This interpretation has been consistently followed,m and re-
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). During a
hearing leading to the adoption of section 16(b), one of the drafters explained the operation
of the section as follows: "You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expecta-
tion to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible
to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the direc-
tor intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing." Hearings on Stock
Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
11. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 385, 387 (1953); Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation:
A Section 16(b) "Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1034, 1035 (1969).
12. See Cook & Feldman, supra note 11, at 386; Meeker & Cooney, supra note 2, at 953.
13. See notes 25-32 infra and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 33-34 infra and accompanying text.
17. See W. Painter, Federal Regulation of Insider Trading 24-52 (1968).
18. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 US. 751 (1943).
19. Id. at 235.
20. See note 10 supra.
21. 136 F.2d at 236. In 1959, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that
"the statutory mandate . . . presupposes that, at some moment before making a sale of
stock, the insider was in an offidal position which he could have used to influence the sale
price." Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 848 (2d Cir. 1959) (emphasis omitted).
22. 136 F.2d at 236.
23. See, e.g., Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
granted sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405 U.S. 1064
(1972); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert, denied sub nom.
Blau v. Petteys, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 US. 987 (1966); Blau v. Max Factor & Co.,
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cently the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in reaffirming the Smolowe
doctrine stated: "The objective standard of Section 16(b) imposes strict lia-
bility upon substantially all transactions occurring within the statutory time
period, regardless of the intent of the insider or the existence of actual
speculation. '24
This strict liability originally encompassed many complex transactions as
the courts liberally interpreted the meanings of "purchase" and "sale." In
Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,25 the defendant, a more-than-101o% share-
holder, within a six month period converted preferred stock into common and
thereafter sold the common20 In an expansive reading of the statutory defini-
tion27 of purchase,28 the court held that any "conversion of preferred into
common stock followed by a sale within six months is a 'purchase and sale'
within the statutory language of § 16(b).1129 Consistent with this reasoning,
several courts have expanded the scope of section 16(b) liability to include
the exercise of options and warrants. 80 However, acknowledging the harsh-
ness of such general definitions,3 ' other courts have adopted a far more prag-
matic interpretation of what will constitute a purchase. Under such scrutiny
section 16(b) will be applied to unusual purchase and sale transactions only
if the "possibility of speculative abuse" exists.
32
342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965) ; Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786
(2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
24. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1971).
25. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
26. Id. at 986-87.
27. The court stated: "Whatever doubt might otherwise exist as to whether a conversion
is a 'purchase' is dispelled by definition of 'purchase' to include 'any contract to buy, pur-
chase, or otherwise acquire.'" Id. at 987 (citation omitted); see Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 3(a)(13) & (14), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14) (1970). As late as 1965, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit still applied this broad interpretation stating that "the test
employed in Park & Tilford employs the language of §§ 3(a) (13) and 3(a) (14) in the man-
ner which we think Congress intended it to be used . . . ." Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352
F.2d 156, 164 (3d Cir. 1965). Contra, Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferralolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970) pro-
vides: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or other-
wise acquire."
29. 160 F.2d at 987.
30. E.g., Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 820 (1953); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Steinberg v.
Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951).
Contra, Abramns v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted
sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
31. See Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 45 (1968).
32. E.g., Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
granted sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405 U.S. 1064
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Apart from these attempts to restrict the types of purchase and sale situa-
tions to be included within the scope of section 16(b), federal courts have
continued to otherwise expand its purview through liberal interpretation of
the term "director' 33 to the extent that directors may be liable for profits
realized in short-swing transactions although they were not directors at the
time of purchase.34 In a similar manner, the courts have liberally construed
the definition of what constitutes 10% ownership "at the time of" purchase
and sale. In Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,as the court held that "at
the time of" meant "simultaneous with" with the result that purchases which
make a person a more-than-10%o owner are included within the scope of sec-
tion 16(b).6 Moreover, a series of purchases pursuant to a single tender
(1972) ; Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Blau v.
Petteys, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 Fad 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959). The rule as stated in 1966 was that "[ilf, from an examination of the particular
facts, a transaction is of a kind that can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed
by § 16(b) and falls within the broad definitions of 'purchase' and 'sale', it will be so defined.
However, if an examination of the facts indicates that there is no possibility of abuse, there
is no need to apply a § 16(b) label to the transaction." Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535
(8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Blau v. Petteys, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967) (citation
omitted). In 1966, SEC Rule 16b-9 exempted conversions from liability under section 16(b).
17 C.FR. § 240.16b-9 (1972).
33. Under a "deputization" theory expounded by Judge Learned Hand in his concurring
opinion in Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1952), a partnership could
be held liable as an inside director if the firm deputized a partner "to represent its interests
as a director on the board ... ." Id. at 567. The "deputization" theory subsequently recog-
nized the possibility of partnerships and corporations incurring section 16(b) liability. Feder
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 Fa2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970);
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (SM.DN.Y. 196S); see Blau v.
Lehman, 368 US. 403 (1962).
34. Adler v. Klawans, 172 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aftd, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1959); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Similarly, in Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 406 F2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1036 (1970), Martin
Marietta (the defendant corporation) purchased stock in Sperry Rand Corporation, while de-
fendant's president was a Sperry director. After a short time Martin Marietta's president re-
signed from his position with Sperry. Subsequently defendant sold its Sperry stock, the sale
taking place within six months of the stock purchase. Relying on a "deputization" theory,
the court held that the defendant had been a "director" of Sperry and that section 16(b)
attaches to a sale by a former director if the stock is purchased while he was a director and
the sale takes place within six months of the purchase. Id. at 269.
35. 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 US. 831 (1956). The court of appeals
adopted the reasoning of the district court's denial of a motion for judgment in 104 F. Supp.
957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
36. 232 F.2d at 300-01. Stella, the defendant corporation, purchased shares of plaintiff
corporation by which defendant changed its status from a less-than-10% to a more-than-
10% owner. The court of appeals adopting the lower court's interpretation of the words
"at the time of" purchase to mean "simultaneously with" held that the defendant became
a more-than-10% owner at the very moment when the purchase was made. 104 F. Supp.
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offer which boost the purchaser's holdings to more than 10% of the cor-
poration's outstanding stock has also been held to fall within the scope of the
Act.3 7 Such decisions indicate that the language of section 16(b) will be con-
strued so as to bring a wide range of short-swing transactions within the reach
of the Act. However, once it has been determined that a defendant comes within
the scope of section 16(b), objective criteria are applied and liability may be
imposed regardless of intent.88
In Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., the Court considered for
the first time the question whether section 16(b) liability would attach to
a seller's "short-swing" profits realized after he had ceased to be a more-than-
10% shareholder by reason of a prior sale.39 Since an investor must own more
than 10% of the stock of a corporation both at the time of the purchase and
at the time of sale40 the applicability of the Act in this situation turns on
the interpretation of the words "at the time of." The district court held that
both transactions were part of a single plan and that "time of sale" should
be construed as including the entire period during which a series of related
transactions took place.4 ' Moreover, the court felt that a contrary holding
"would ...subvert the purposes of Section 16(b) and .. .produce a result
plainly at variance with its manifest policy." 42 The Supreme Court, in reject-
ing this interpretation of the statutory language, recognized the arbitrary na-
ture of the objective standards prescribed by section 16(b).4 3 Mr. Justice
Stewart, speaking for the majority, noted that liability could be avoided if
one did not come within the statutory definition of insider.4 4 He further stated
that any attempt to include transactions of this type by showing the pos-
sibility of "taint" or the seller's pre-existing intent was not in "harmony with
the congressional design of predicating liability upon an 'objective measure of
proof.' ,46 Moreover, while the Court conceded that there may be logic in
at 959-60. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 923-24 (8th Cir.
1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972). The literal meaning of the words "at
the time of" has been the subject of much discussion. See, e.g., 57 Colum. L. Rev. 287, 289
(1957).
37. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom. Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
38. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970). Here the court stated that "[tihe judicial tendency ... has been to interpret
Section 16(b) in ways that are most consistent with the legislative purpose, even departing
where necessary from the literal statutory language. . . .Through the creation of a legal
fiction ... our courts have managed to remain within the limits of § 16(b)' literal language
and yet have expanded the Act's reach." Id. (citations omitted).
39. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
41. 306 F. Supp. at 592.
42. Id.
43. 404 U.S. at 422-23.
44. Id. at 422.
45. Id. at 424-25 (citation omitted).
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allowing this type of proof, it nonetheless felt that such evidence was dearly
rejected as a basis for liability when Congress required that a person must
own more than 10% of the stock of a corporation both at the time of pur-
chase and at the time of sale.46 Reading the statute literally, the Court held
that "a statutory insider might sell enough shares to bring his holdings below
10%, and later-but still within six months-sell additional shares," thereby
incurring no liability for the latter transactions.47 In the opinion of the Court,
any potential for abuse arising under this loophole should be prevented by
legislative amendment rather than a "judicial search for the will-o'-the-wisp
of an investor's 'intent'. ... ,,48
Mr. Justice Douglas 9 in a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan
and White, reminded the Court of the abuses of insider trading and of the
history behind the enactment of section 16(b).50 He concluded that the ma-
jority's interpretation was "plainly at variance" with the purposes and policy
of the legislation.51 Analyzing prior judicial construction of this section, he
observed that the problem in interpreting the section was not one of semantics
but rather one of the resolution of the cases in light of legislative intent to
prevent insider short-swing speculation.r2 His dissent also stressed that other
courts had often felt that section 16(b) was not so objective in nature as
to prevent factual inquiry and analysis.5 3 He, therefore, reasoned that if in-
quiry could be made into the existences of speculative abuses5 and "de facto"
directors, 55 a court could also determine whether the facts substantiated a
finding that "ostensibly separate sales [were] 'legally tied.' "50
46. Id. at 424.
47. Id. at 423. In this instance the Court referred to a commentator who interpreted the
statute similarly. Id. at 423 n-3; see C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 112
(1934).
48. 404 U.S. at 425.
49. Mr. Justice Douglas was a commissioner of the SEC in 1936 and was appointed Chair-
man in 1937.
50. 404 U.S. at 428-31.
51. Id. at 431 (citation omitted). The dissent was of the opinion that the Court under-
mined the statute in the guise of an "objective" approach which had been once used to broadly
incur liability.
52. Id. at 433. Mr. Justice Douglas noted that Mr. Justice Stewart, while on the court of
appeals, deviated from the "mechanistic" approach he espoused in the majority opinion. Id.
at 432. In Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959), Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that a transaction which might
constitute a purchase was to be judged so that if it could "possibly lend itself to ... specula-
tion" it would be governed by section 16(b). He therefore refused to apply an arbitrary test
but applied a more pragmatic one. Id. at 345.
53. 404 U.S. at 434-36.
54. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
56. 404 U.S. at 436-37 (footnote omitted). Here Mr. Justice Douglas noted that a factual
inquiry was used to determine whether possibility of speculative abuse existed (Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 US. 927 (1959)), whether a firm
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Rejecting the majority's "mechanical" approach and noting the probability
that any series of sales within six months of a major part of the shares held
by a more-than-10o shareholder would be part of a single plan, Mr. Justice
Douglas urged an alternative standard, one that would create a "rebuttable
presumption" that any "series of dispositive transactions will be deemed to
be part of... a single 'sale' for the purposes of § 16(b). 5 7 Such a rule would
not involve the problems of proof of intent, he reasoned, since a factual in-
quiry into the circumstances surrounding the transactions would be sufficient.08
Only if the beneficial owner could carry the burden of proof that the series
of transactions afforded him no opportunity for speculative abuse would he be
able to rebut the presumption and escape liability. 0
The prophylactic effect of section 16(b)-prevention of short-swing specula-
tion-has been significantly weakened by the Reliance decision. Perhaps the
Court reached an equitable solution since Emerson had not participated in any
speculative abuses, e° but the decision seems contrary to the avowed purpose
of section 16(b) to hold parties liable irrespective of actual intent or abuse.01
Furthermore, the Court has created a loophole 2 through which an Investor
may avoid 16(b) liability on at least part of his short-swing transactions. An
investor may purchase sufficient stock in a corporation to gain inside informa-
tion or to control corporate activity, and then sell within six months in two
can be a director under a "deputization" theory (Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962)), and
whether an individual although not called a director may be a "de facto" officer or director
(Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949)). As a result of these cases, Mr. Justice Douglas
noted: "Insiders have come to recognize that 'in order not to defeat [§ 16(b)'sl avowed ob-
jective,' federal courts will resolve 'all doubts and ambiguities against insiders!'" 404 U.S. at
436 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 438 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 439. The dissent, noting that the statutory elimination of proof of intent was
not adopted to limit actions but rather was intended to ease plaintiff's burden, rejected the
district court's plan where the plaintiff would have been required to prove a "plan of distribu-
tion." Id. at 437. Also the dissent's rule would not "import questions of 'intent'" since It
would require only an objective analysis. Id. at 439. In addition, the Court rejected the
SEC's claim that this transaction came within the meaning of section 16(b), since SEC Rule
16a-10 provided an exemption in reporting and hence from 16(b) liability in a situation like
the one at hand. Furthermore, it noted that SEC interpretations are not determinative of the
law. Id. at 425-27. Mr. justice Douglas rebutted the contention that Rule 16a-10 exempted
this transaction. He stated that in Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir. 197), It
was held that the SEC's power to make rules is not solely within its discretion; and more
recently in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970), Rule 16a-1o was held invalid where it exempted transactions by ex-dlrectors
from liability under section 16(b). 404 U.S. at 440-41.
59. 404 U.S. at 440.
60. Id. at 420.
61. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
62. Various members of the news media have interpreted the decision as the opening of a
large loophole by the Supreme Court. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1972, at 3, col. 1-2. The circuit
court compared this conduct with that of tax avoidance. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance
Elee. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 925 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
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or more transactions, retaining profits on all sales where he owned at the time
of the sale less than 10% of the stock of the corporation. Although the argu-
ment may be made that Rule 10b-56 would cover the later transactions if
inside information were used, it is not persuasive since Rule 10b-5 requires
proof of actual use of the inside information, 4 while a primary purpose of
section 16(b) was to eliminate the need for such proof in the case of insider
trading.65 Justice Douglas' proposal, although necessitating more subjective
judgment on the part of the finder of fact, would seem more consistent with
legislative purpose and the recent pragmatic trend favored by a number of
the courts.66 In 1968, the Supreme Court, in its only other decision concerning
section 16(b),87 indicated its approval of a subjective approach. In Blau v.
Lehman, a court was permitted to make a factual inquiry to determine whether,
for the purposes of section 16(b) liability, an officer had been deputized by a
partnership to represent its interests as a director on the board of a corpora-
tion.08 Certainly, it is no more offensive to the objective nature of the section
to allow inquiry into whether a series of transactions may be legally connected.
It would seem, therefore, that the Court has abandoned the trend toward
application of section 16(b) to more complex insider transactions and will now
require such transactions to conform more strictly to the mechanical language
of the statute.
Criticism of this change in trend, however, must lie not solely with the
Reliance decision but also with the operation of the section itself. First, the
six-month rule is not an effective deterrent since any insider can wait for six
months and one day to avoid liability.6 9 Second, relatives, friends and busi-
ness associates of the insider whose liability under Rule 10(b)-5 may be dif-
ficult or impossible to prove, may be able to benefit from the insider's position
without falling within the scope of the section.70 Third, since the insider is
forced to disgorge at most his profits, there is no penalty imposed for his
unfair practices per se. Should no profit result, he incurs no penalty under sec-
tion 16(b). Fourth, a party actually hurt by the transaction, e.g., a share-
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
64. See 1 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud (SEC Rule 10b-S) § 2.6(1), at SO n.135
(1971).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). See note 10
supra; Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1961).
66. It is paradoxical that Mr. Justice Stewart who as a circuit judge was a forerunner in
the adoption of a more realistic approach to section 16(b) should revert back to a literal
interpretation of the law. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
67. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
68. Id. at 408-10.
69. Under the Internal Revenue Code, securities must be held for six months in order to
qualify for capital gains treatment. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 1222(3), 26 US.C.
§ 1222(3) (1970).
70. Original draft provisions of section 16(b) allowed the recovery of profits from any-
one who received information from an insider. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.. 403, 411-12
(1962); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943).
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holder who buys or sells without the benefit of the insider's knowledge, is
afforded no remedy under section 16(b), since only the issuer may recover
the insider's profits. 1' Finally, the section has become "a trap and a snare"
7 2
for the unwary while the experienced investor will follow the letter of the law
and take all precautions to avoid liability.7 3
These numerous defects have brought forth calls for revision,74 repeal"0 and
broader judicial construction of the statute.70 To let the section stand and rely
on the courts to apply it to an increasing number of situations, where there is
abuse of inside information, would be the least helpful solution since myriad
suits and varying interpretations of the statutory language would make the
section an even worse snare for unwary, innocent investors. Repeal of the sec-
tion and reliance on the ever expanding Rule 10b-577 has received some sup-
port but is also not a totally satisfactory solution, since lob-5 actions require
proof of intent and of abuse of inside information, requirements which the
drafters of section 16(b) expressly sought to eliminate.
Revision appears to be the only truly effective solution. One revision might
be the inclusion in section 16(b) of a rebuttable presumption which would
make all insider purchases and sales within a longer statutory period violative
of the section. 78 Innocent investors would have an opportunity to prove they
did not abuse their position and that they lacked the required intent. Obvious
speculators would be hard pressed to prove their good faith and would have
to hold their shares for a longer period of time to relieve themselves of the
presumption. Plaintiffs would not be forced, as under Rule 10(b), to prove
intent or actual abuse.
The initial reaction of the Securities Exchange Commission to the Reliance
decision makes it seem likely that the agency will soon present the issue to
Congress.7 9
71. He does, however, receive his pro rata share of the money returned to the corporate
treasury as a shareholder of the corporation.
72. Lowenfels, supra note 31, at 63.
73. The businessman who intends only to purchase a company may find himself caught
in a defensive merger where he is forced to liquidate his shares within the six-month perlod
and incur unexpected section 16(b) liability.
74. Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to
"Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats", 52 Cornell L.Q. 69 (1966) (footnoto
omitted).
75. Professor Henry G. Manne raises the interesting theory that not only should the
section be abolished but also that inside trading is helpful and should be encouraged. H.
Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966).
76. Lowenfels, supra note 31, at 63-64.
77. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910-14 (1961).
78. A proposal almost identical to this was made in 1966. Munter, supra note 74, at
89-101.
79. 135 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. A-4 (Jan. 19, 1972).
